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Preface 
The European Association for Cognitive Systems is the association resulting from the 
EUCog network, which has been active since 2006. It has ca. 1000 members and is currently 
chaired by Vincent C. Müller. We ran our annual conference on December 08-09 2016, 
kindly hosted by the Technical University of Vienna with Markus Vincze as local chair. The 
invited speakers were David Vernon and Paul F.M.J. Verschure. 
Out of the 49 submissions for the meeting, we accepted 18 a papers and 25 as posters (after 
double-blind reviewing). Papers are published here as “full papers” or “short papers” while 
posters are published here as “short papers” or “abstracts”. 
Some of the papers presented at the conference will be published in a separate special 
volume on ‘Cognitive Robot Architectures’ with the journal Cognitive Systems Research. 
RC, VCM, YS, MV 
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Industrial Priorities for Cognitive Robotics
David Vernon†
Carnegie Mellon University Africa
Rwanda
Email: vernon@cmu.edu
Markus Vincze
Technische Universita¨t Wien
Austria
Email: vincze@acin.tuwien.ac.at
Abstract—We present the results of a survey of industrial
developers to determine what they and their customers require
from a cognitive robot. These are cast as a series of eleven
functional abilities:
1) Safe, reliable, transparent operation.
2) High-level instruction and context-aware task execution.
3) Knowledge acquisition and generalization.
4) Adaptive planning.
5) Personalized interaction.
6) Self-assessment.
7) Learning from demonstration.
8) Evaluating the safety of actions.
9) Development and self-optimization.
10) Knowledge transfer.
11) Communicating intentions and collaborative action.
I. INDUSTRIAL REQUIREMENTS
While cognitive robotics is still an evolving discipline and
much research remains to be done, we nevertheless need to
have a clear idea of what cognitive robots will be able to
do if they are to be useful to industrial developers and end
users. The RockEU2 project canvassed the views of thirteen
developers to find out what they and their customers want.
The results of this survey follow, cast as a series of eleven
functional abilities.
A. Safe, reliable, transparent operation
Cognitive robots will be able to operate reliably and safely
around humans and they will be able to explain the decisions
they make, the actions they have taken, and the actions they are
about to take. A cognitive robot will help people and prioritize
their safety. Only reliable behaviour will build trust. It will
explain decisions, i.e. why it acted the way it did. This is
essential if the human is to develop a sense of trust in the
robot.
A cognitive robot will have limited autonomy to set interme-
diate goals to when carrying out tasks set by users. However,
in all cases it defers to the users preferences, apart from
some exceptional circumstances, e.g. people with dementia
can interact in unpredictable ways and the robot will be able
to recognize these situations and adapt in some appropriate
manner.
The freedom to act autonomously will have formal bound-
aries and the rules of engagement will be set on the basis of
†Much of the work described in this paper was conducted while the author
was at the University of Sko¨vde, Sweden. This research was funded by the
European Commission under grant agreement No: 688441, RockEU2.
three parameters: safety for people, safety for equipment, and
safety of the robot system. The rules may change depending
on the environment and a cognitive robot will not exceed
the limits of safe operation. The limits may be application
specific, e.g., the robot should not deviate further than a given
specification/distance/etc. A cognitive robot will use this type
of knowledge to act responsibly and will ask for assistance
when necessary (e.g. before it encounters difficulties). In
particular, in emergency situations, the robot will stop all tasks
to follow some emergency procedure. Ideally, if the user is
deliberately trying to misuse the robot, e.g. programming it to
assist with some unethical task, a cognitive robot will cease
operation.
B. High-level instruction and context-aware task execution
Cognitive robots will be given tasks using high-level in-
structions and they will factor in contextual constraints that
are specific to the application scenario when carrying out
these tasks, determining for themselves the priority of possible
actions in case of competing or conflicting requirements.
Goals and tasks will be expressed using high-level instruc-
tions that will exploit the robots contextual knowledge of the
task. This will allow the robot to pre-select the information
that is important to effectively carry out the task. The goals
will reflect the users perspective. This means that all skills
which implicitly define the goals are tightly linked to real-
world needs and to the solution of specific problems, e.g., “get
me a hammer”. The following guidelines will apply.
• Instructions will use natural language and gestures to
specify the goals.
• Natural language will be relatively abstract but will be
grounded in the codified organisational rules, regulations,
and behavioural guidelines that apply to a given ap-
plication environment. This grounding means that each
abstract instruction is heavily loaded with constraints
which should make it easier for the robot to understand
and perform the task effectively.
• The goals should be specified in a formalised and struc-
tured way, where the designer defines them well and can
verify them. For example, teach the robot the environment
it is working in, follow a described route to reach each of
the target locations and reach these positions to carry out
the task. These clearly-specified tasks are tightly coupled
with risks and costs, e.g. of incorrect execution.
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• It should be possible for the robot to be given goals in
non-specific terms (e.g. assist in alleviating the symptoms
of dementia), guidelines on acceptable behaviour (or
action policies), and relevant constraints, leaving it to the
robot to identify the sub-goals that are needed to achieve
these ultimate goals.
• A cognitive robot will learn ways of measuring the
success of outcomes for the objectives that have been
set, e.g., creating a metric such as the owners satisfaction
related not only to the directly specified objective but also
the manner in which the job was done). It should be learn
from these metrics.
A cognitive robot will consider the contextual constraints
that are specific to the application scenario. It will determine
the priority of potential actions, e.g., in case of competing or
conflicting needs.
For example, the robot might know the procedure to be
followed but the locations to be visited or the objects to be
manipulated need to be specified (or vice versa). For example,
when an automated harvester encounters a bale of straw, it
can deal with it as an obstacle or something to be harvested,
depending on the current task. For example, the robot might
engage in spoken interaction with older adults until the goal is
communicated unambiguously, using context to disambiguate
the message and allow for the difficulties in dealing with
different accents, imprecise speech, and poor articulation.
A cognitive robot will know what is normal, i.e. expected,
behaviour (possibly based on documented rules or practices)
and it will be able to detect anomalous behaviour and then
take appropriate action.
The following guidelines will apply.
• It will be possible to pre-load knowledge about the
robots purpose and its operating environment, including
any rules or constraints that apply to behaviour in that
environment.
• It will be possible to utilize domain-specific skill pools
(e.g. from shared databases) so that the robot is pre-
configured to accomplish basic tasks without having to
resort to learning or development.
• The robot will continually improve its skills (within limits
of the goals and safety, see above) and share these with
other robots.
• The robot might assist the user by proposing goals from
what it understood and the user makes the final selection.
The level of detail in the description required by a cognitive
robot will decrease over time as the robot gains experience,
in the same way as someone new on the job is given very
explicit instructions at first and less explicit instructions later
on. One should need to demonstrate only the novel parts of
the task, e.g., pouring liquid in a container, but not the entire
process.
It will be possible to instruct the robot off-line if there is no
access to the physical site; e.g., using a simulation tool, with
the robot then being deployed in the real scenario.
C. Knowledge acquisition and generalization
Cognitive robots will continuously acquire new knowledge
and generalize that knowledge so that they can undertake new
tasks by generating novel action policies based on their history
of decisions. This will allow the rigor and level of detail with
which a human expresses the task specification to be relaxed
on future occasions.
A cognitive robot will build and exploit experience so
that its decisions incorporate current and long term data.
For example, route planning in a factory, hospital, or hotel
should take into account the history of rooms and previous
paths taken, or it might take another look to overcome high
uncertainty. In general, the robot will overcome uncertainty in
a principled manner.
A cognitive robot will generalize knowledge to new task by
understanding the context of a novel task and extrapolating
from previous experience. For example, a care-giving robot
will reuse knowledge of a rehabilitation exercise, customizing
it to another person. A welding robot will weld a new instance
of a family of parts. In general, a cognitive robot will extract
useful meaning from an interaction for a future and more
general use, with the same or another user. This may extend
to learn cultural preferences and social norms.
For example, in a domestic environment, a cognitive robot
will learn how to do simple household tasks, e.g. how to grasp
different objects and them bring to a person that wants them.
This will be continuously extended, allowing the robot to do
more complex things, including cooking.
D. Adaptive planning
Cognitive robots will be able to anticipate events and
prepare for them in advance. They will be able to cope
with unforeseen situations, recognizing and handling errors,
gracefully and effectively. This will also allow them to handle
flexible objects or living creatures.
A cognitive robot will be able to recognize that circum-
stances have changed to avoid situations where progress is
impossible. It will also be able to recognize errors and recover.
This may include retrying with a slightly different strategy.
The learning process will be fast, ideally learning from each
error.
A cognitive robot will be able to learn how to handle
errors, how to react to situations where, e.g., a human is doing
something unexpected or parts are located in an unexpected
place.
A cognitive robot will be able to anticipate events and
compensate for future conditions. For example, an automated
combine harvester will be able to apply a pre-emptive increase
of power to compensate for the demands caused when an area
of high yield is encountered.
A cognitive robot will be able to learn about the environ-
ment it is in and modify the its current information accord-
ingly. That is, it will adapt to changes in the environment,
verifying that the environment matches with what is known,
or there is a change and updates. This may require an update
of the task but only after asking the user.
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A cognitive robot will be able to manipulate flexible or live
objects, e.g. living creatures such as laboratory mice. To do
so means that the robot must be able to construct a model of
their behaviour and adapt its actions as required, continually
refining the model.
E. Personalized interaction
Cognitive robots will personalize their interactions with
humans, adapting their behaviour and interaction policy to
the users preferences, needs, and emotional or psychological
state. This personalization will include an understanding of
the person’s preferences for the degree of force used when
interacting with the robot. A cognitive robot will be able to
adapt its behaviour and interaction policy to accommodate
the user’s preferences, needs, and emotional state. It will
learn the personal preferences of the person with whom it
is interacting. For example, an autonomous car will learn the
preferred driving style of the owner and adopt that style to
engender trust.
A cognitive robot will understand nuances in tone to learn a
person’s voice, detecting signs of stress so that it can react to it
and review what it is doing. In the particular case of interaction
with older adults, the robot will be able to understand gestures
to help disambiguate words.
A cognitive robot will able to extrapolate what has been
taught to other situations. For example, it might remember
that the user has certain preferences (e.g. to be served tea in
the morning) and the robot will remember that preference.
However, the robot will not allow these learned preferences to
over-ride critical actions policies.
In cases where showing the robot what to do involves
physical contact between the user and the robot, the robot
will be able to learn the dynamics of the user, i.e. his or her
personal preferred use of forces when interacting with objects
in the environment.
A cognitive robot will be able to the psychological state of
a user, e.g. based on the facial expressions, gestures, actions,
movements. Based on this, it will be able to determine what
they need by cross-referencing that with knowledge of the
persons history.
A cognitive robot will be able to make decisions from a
large body of observed data, thereby assisting people who
typically make decisions based on learned heuristic knowledge
but without a quantitative basis for this decision-making. For
example, there is a need to provide farmers with a fact-
based quantitative decision-making framework. A cognitive
robot or machine would observe the physical environment and
the farmer and provide a sound bases for making improved
decisions.
F. Self-assessment
Cognitive robots will be able to reason about their own capa-
bilities, being able to determine whether they can accomplish
a given task. If they detect something is not working, they will
be able to ask for help. They will be able to assess the quality
of their decisions.
If a cognitive robot is asked to perform a certain task, it
will be able to say whether it can do it or not. It will detect
when something is not working and will be able to ask for
help.
A cognitive robot will assess the quality of its decisions
and apply some level of discrimination in the task at hand,
e.g. being selective in its choice of fruit to harvest.
G. Learning from demonstration
Cognitive robots will be able to learn new actions from
demonstration by humans and they will be able to link
this learned knowledge to previously acquired knowledge of
related tasks and entities.
Instructions will be communicated by demonstration,
through examples, including showing the robot the final re-
sults, with the robot being able to merge prior know-how and
knowledge with learning by demonstration. Some of this prior
knowledge should be extracted from codified organisational
rules, regulations, and behavioural guidelines.
The situation is analogous to training an intern or an
apprentice: a trainer might ask“Has someone shown you how
to do this? No? Okay, Ill show you how to do three, then you
do 100 to practice (and to throw away afterwards). If you get
stuck on one, call me, and Ill show you how to solve that
problem”.
A cognitive robot will learn and adapt the parameters to
achieve the task. Today in the assembly of components, often
robot assembly is not robotized because it requires too much
engineering and it is too difficult for robots because it is based
on traditional programming, tuning and frequent re-tuning of
parameters.
Teaching will exploit natural language, gaze and pointing
gestures, and by showing the robot what to do and helping it
when necessary.
Actions will be expressed in high-level abstract terms, like
a recipe, ideally by talking to it. For example, “go to hall 5
from hall 2 and pick up the hammer” or “open the valve”.
When being taught, the robot should be anticipating what
you are trying to teach it so that it predicts what you want it
to do and then tries to do it effectively.
It will be possible to provide direct support for the robot,
switching fluidly between full autonomy, partial autonomy, or
manual control.
H. Evaluating the safety of actions
When they learn a new action, cognitive robots will take
steps to verify the safety of carrying out this action. If a robot
learns new action, it will be difficult to certify the new action.
The process of generating a new action will involve interaction
with the world and that may already be harmful. So, when
learning a new action, there needs to be a step to verify the
safety of carrying out this action. For example, showing a new
action plus defining safety and success such that the robot can
check if it achieved success.
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I. Development and self-optimization
Cognitive robots will develop and self-optimize, learning in
an open-ended manner from their own actions and those of
others (humans or other robots), continually improving their
abilities.
A cognitive robot will be able to use what it has learned
to determine possible ways to improve its performance, e.g.
through internal simulation at times when the robot is not
working on a given task. It will also be able to learn from its
mistakes, e.g., breaking china but learning from the effect of
the action. A cognitive robot will learn to optimize the actions
it performs (e.g. doing something faster) within the certified
limits of safety and without increasing the risk of failure and
associated costs.
J. Knowledge transfer
Cognitive robots will be able to transfer knowledge to
other robots, even those having a different physical, kinematic,
and dynamic configurations and they will be able to operate
seamlessly in an environment that is configured as an internet
of things (IoT).
A cognitive robot will be a crucial component of cyber-
physical systems where the robot can be used, for example,
as a way of collecting data from large experiments.
K. Communicating intentions and collaborative action
Cognitive robots will be able to communicate their inten-
tions to people around them and, vice versa, they will be
able to infer the intention of others, i.e. understanding what
someone is doing and anticipating what they are about to
do. Ultimately, Cognitive robots will be able to collaborate
with people on some joint task with a minimal amount of
instruction.
The need for people around a cognitive robot to be able to
anticipate the robots actions is important because, if cognitive
robots are to be deployed successfully, people need to believe
the robot is trustworthy. A cognitive robot will be able to
interact with people, collaborating with them on some joint
task. This implies that the robot has an ability to understand
what the person is doing and infer their intentions.
II. CONCLUSION
Establishing functional requirements is an essential pre-
requisite to developing useful systems. This is as true of
cognitive robotics as it is for any other domain of information
and communication technology. However, the effort to give
robots a capacity for cognition is made more difficult by the
fact that cognitive science, as a discipline in its own right,
does not yet have many established normative models that
lend themselves to realization in well-engineered systems.
The goal of the work described in this short paper is to re-
assert the priority of user requirements in the specification
of cognitive robot systems. The motivation underpinning this
goal is that, having identified these requirements, we can then
proceed to determine the scientific and technological tools
and techniques — drawn from the disciplines of artificial
intelligence, autonomous systems, and cybernetics, among
others — that can be deployed to satisfy these requirements
in practical robots. It remains to complete this exercise.
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Abstract—We apply the cognitive architecture SEMLINCS
to model multi-agent cooperations in a Super Mario game
environment. SEMLINCS is a predictive, self-motivated control
architecture that learns conceptual, event-oriented schema rules.
We show how the developing, general schema rules yield coop-
erative behavior, taking into account individual beliefs and envi-
ronmental context. The implemented agents are able to recognize
other agents as individual actors, learning about their respective
abilities from observation, and considering them in their plans. As
a consequence, they are able to simulate changes in their context-
dependent scope of action with respect to their own interactions
with the environment, interactions of other agents with the
environment, as well as interactions between agents, yielding
coordinated multi-agent plans. The plans are communicated
between the agents and establish a common ground to initiate
cooperation. In sum, our results show how cooperative behavior
can be planned and coordinated, developing from sensorimotor
experience and predictive, event-based structures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of the approaches on intelligent, autonomous game
agents are robust, but behavior is typically scripted, pre-
dictable, and hardly flexible. Current game agents are still
rather limited in their speech and learning capabilities as well
as in the way they act believably in a self-motivated manner.
While novel artificial intelligent agents have been developed
over the past decades, the level of intelligence, the interaction
capabilities, and the behavioral versatility of these agents are
still far from optimal [1], [2].
Besides the lack of truly intelligent game agents, however,
the main motivation for this work comes from cognitive sci-
ence and artificial intelligence. Over the past two decades, two
major trends have established themselves in cognitive science.
First, cognition is embodied, or grounded, in the sensory-
, motor-, and body-mediated experiences that humans and
other adaptive animals gather in their environment [3]. Second,
brains are predictive encoding systems, which have evolved
to be able to anticipate incoming sensory information, thus
learning predominantly from the differences between predicted
and actual sensory information [4]–[7]. Combined with the
principle of free-energy-based inference, neural learning, as
well as active epistemic and motivation-driven inference, a uni-
fied brain principle has been proposed [8], [9]. Concurrently,
it has been emphasized that event signals may be processed
in a unique manner by our brains. The event segmentation
theory [10], [11] suggests that humans learn to segment the
continuous sensorimotor stream into event codes, which are
also closely related to the common coding framework and
the theory of event coding [12], [13]. Already in [10] it was
proposed that such event codes are very well-suited to be
integrated into event schema-based rules, which are closely
related to production rules [14] and rules generated by antic-
ipatory behavior control mechanisms [15]. As acknowledged
from a cognitive robotics perspective, event-based knowledge
structures are as well eligible to be embedded into a linguistic,
grammatical system [16]–[18].
We apply the principles of predictive coding and active
inference and integrate them into a highly modularized, cogni-
tive system architecture. We call the architecture SEMLINCS,
which is a loose acronym for SEMantic, SEnsory-Motor, SElf-
Motivated, Learning, INtelligent Cognitive System [19]. The
architecture is motivated by a recent proposition towards a
unifed subsymbolic computational theory of cognition [20],
which puts forward how production rule-like systems (such
as SOAR or ACT-R) may be grounded in sensorimotor expe-
riences by means of predictive encodings and free energy-
based inference. The theory also emphasizes how active-
inference-based, goal-directed behavior may yield a fully
autonomous, self-motivated, goal-oriented behavioral system
and how conceptual predictive structures may be learned by
focusing generalization and segmentation mechanisms on the
detection of events and event transitions.
SEMLINCS is essentially a predictive control architecture
that learns event schema rules and interacts with its world
in a self-motivated, goal- and information-driven manner. It
specifies a continuously unfolding cognitive control process
that incorporates (i) a self-motivated behavioral system, (ii)
event-oriented learning of probabilistic event schema rules,
(iii) hierarchical, goal-oriented, probabilistic reasoning, plan-
ning, and decision making, (iv) speech comprehension and
generation mechanisms, and (v) interactions thereof.
Here, our focus lies on studying artificial, cognitive game
agents. Consequently, we offer an implementation of SEM-
LINCS to control game agents in a Super Mario game envi-
ronment123. Seeing that the game is in fact rather complex,
1https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AplG6KnOr2Q
2https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ltPj3RlN4Nw
3https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GzDt1t iMU8
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the implementation of SEMLINCS faces a diverse collection
of tasks. The implemented cognitive game agents are capable
of completing Super Mario levels autonomously or coopera-
tively, solving a variety of deductive problems and interaction
tasks. Our implementation focuses on learning and applying
schematic rules that enable artificial agents to cause behav-
iorally relevant intrinsic and extrinsic effects, such as collect-
ing, creating, or destroying objects in the simulated world,
carrying other agents, or changing an agent’s internal state,
such as the health level. Signals of persistent surprise in these
domains can be registered [21], which results in the issuance
of event schema learning [20], and which is closely related to
the reafference principle [22]. As a result, production-rule-like,
sensorimotor-grounded event schemas develop from signals
of surprise and form predictive models that can be applied
for planning. SEMLINCS thus offers a next step towards
complete cognitive systems, which include learning techniques
and which build a hierarchical, conceptualized model of their
environment in order to interact with it in a self-motivated,
self-maintenance-oriented manner.
A significant aspect when considering multi-agent architec-
tures inspired by human cognition is cooperation and commu-
nication: Unique aspects of human cognition are characterized
by social skills like empathy, understanding the perspective of
others, building common ground by communication, and en-
gaging in joint activities [23]. As a step towards these abilities,
we show that the developing event-oriented, schematic knowl-
edge structures enable the implemented SEMLINCS agents to
cooperatively achieve joint goals. Thus, our implementation
shows how sensorimotor grounded event codes can enable
and thus bootstrap cooperative interactions between artificial
agents. SEMLINCS is designed such that the developing
knowledge structures and the motivational system can be
coupled with a natural language processing component. In our
implementation, agents are able to learn from voice inputs
of an instructor, follow instructed goals and motivations, and
communicate their gathered plans and beliefs to the instructor.
Moreover, they can propose to and discuss with other game
agents potential joint action plans.
In the following, we provide a general overview of the
modular structure of SEMLINCS in application to the Su-
per Mario game environment. Moreover, we outline key as-
pects for coordinated cooperation in our implementation. We
evaluate the system in selected multi-agent deduction tasks,
focusing on learning, semantic grounding, and conceptual
reasoning with respect to agent-individual abilities, beliefs, and
environmental context. The final discussion puts forward the
insights gained from our modeling effort, highlights important
design choices, as well as current limitations and possible
system enhancements.
II. SEMLINCS IN APPLICATION TO SUPER MARIO
Here we give a brief overview of the main characteristics
of SEMLINCS in application to the Super Mario game en-
vironment. A detailed description is available in [19]. The
implementation consists of five interacting modules as seen
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Fig. 1. Overview of the main modules and the cognitive control loop in the
implementation of SEMLINCS.
in Figure 1. The motivational system (i) specifies drives that
activate goal-effects that are believed to bring the system
towards homeostasis. The drives comprise an urge to col-
lect coins, make progress in the level, interact with novel
objects, and maintain a specific health level. Goal-effects
selected by the motivational system are then processed by an
event-anticipatory schematic planning module (ii) that infers
a sequence of abstract, environmental interactions that are
believed to cause the effects in the current context. The
interaction sequence is then planned in terms of actual motor
commands by the sensorimotor planning module (iii), which
infers a sequence of keystrokes that will result in the desired
interactions. Both, the schematic and sensorimotor forward
models used for planning are also used to generate forward
simulations of the currently expected behavioral consequences.
These forwards simulations are continuously compared with
the actual observations by the event-schematic knowledge and
learning module (iv), where significant differences are regis-
tered as event transitions that cause the formation of procedu-
ral, context-dependent, event-schematic rules. The principle is
closely related to Jeffrey Zacks and Barbara Tversky’s event
segmentation theory [10], [11] and the reafference principle
[22]. After a desired goal effect was achieved, the respective
drive that caused the goal is lowered, and a new goal is
selected, completing an action cycle. The speech system (v)
provides a natural user interface to all of these processes, and
additionally enables verbal communication between agents. In
the following, we focus on the steps most relevant for our
implementation of coordinated joint actions: Event-schematic
knowledge and planning.
A. Event-Schematic Knowledge and Planning
An event can be defined as a certain type of interaction that
ends with the completion of that interaction. An event bound-
ary marks the end of such an event by co-encoding the encoun-
tered extrinsic and intrinsic changes or effects. Since the possi-
ble interactions with the environment are context-dependent in
nature, we describe an event-schematic rule as a conditional,
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probabilistic mapping from interactions to encountered event
boundaries. Production-rule like schemas can be learned by
means of Bayesian statistics under assumptions that apply in
the Mario environment: Object interactions immediately result
in specific effects, such that temporal dependencies can be
neglected. Furthermore, the effects always occur locally, such
that spatial relations can be neglected. Thus, in the Mario
world, interactions can be restricted to directional collisions,
which may result in particular, immediate effects, given a
specific, local context.
In the SEMLINCS implementation, event boundary detec-
tion is implemented by detecting significant sensory changes
that the agent does not predict by means of its sensorimotor
forward model. Amongst others, these include changes in an
agents’ health level or the number of collected coins, the
destruction or creation of an object, or the action of lifting
or dropping an object or another agent.
The context for the applicability of a schematic rule,
however, is determined by different factors: It includes a
procedural precondition for an interaction, which specifies in
our current implementation the identity of actor and target as
well as the intrinsic state of the actor (i.e. its health level). On
the other hand, an environmental context precondition limits
the applicable rules to the current scope of an action. That
is, the target of a schema rule must be available and the
interaction with the target must be expected to lead to the
desired effect given the current situation. While the compliance
with procedural constraints can be determined easily, the
reachability of objects has to be ascertained by an intelligent
heuristic, which we describe in the following.
B. Simulating the Scope of Action
The scope of action in a simulated scene is determined by
a recursive search based on sensorimotor forward simulations.
The search starts at the observed scene or environmental
context and then simulates a number of simplified movement
primitives in parallel. Each of the simulations results in a num-
ber of collisions (or interactions), as well as a new, simulated
scene. Sufficiently different scenes are then expanded in the
same manner, until the scope of action is sufficiently explored.
As a result, it encompasses the reachable positions as well
as attainable interactions in a local context as provided by
the sensorimotor forward simulation, neglecting, however, the
effects that may result from the interactions.
The simulation of changes in the scope of action is ac-
complished using the abstract, schematic forward simulation
of the local environment. In the current implementation, the
schematic forward model is applied by a stochastic, effect
probability based Dijkstra search. In contrast to the sensori-
motor forward model, it neglects the actual motor commands
but integrates the estimated, attainable interactions in the local
context as provided by the recursive, sensorimotor search.
When specific interactions relevant to the scope of action are
simulated (for example the destruction of a block) the scope
of action is updated.
Fig. 2. Expansion of the scope of action by simulating environmental
interactions. Red fields mark the reachable positions, while blue arrows denote
the registered object interaction options, while simulating the scope of action.
Top row: The scope of action is updated by simulating the destruction of
an object. Bottom row: The scope of action is updated by simulating the
interaction with another agent.
In the first example shown in Figure 2, an agent aims at
collecting a specific item (the coin on the top right). However,
this item is blocked by destructible objects (the golden boxes
to the right of the agent). Assume that the agent has already
learned that it can destroy and collect the respective objects. In
the initial situation (top left picture), however, the learned rule
about how to collect the coin is not applicable. The schematic
planning module thus first simulates the destruction of one
of the blocking objects, and then updates the simulated scope
of action. When there is more than one destructible object in
the current scene, it furthermore has to identify the correct
object for destruction, that is, degeneralize the schematic rule
with respect to the context (in the example, both objects are
suitable). Next, the agent realizes that the desired item can be
collected, given that one of the blocks was destroyed, resulting
in a schematic action plan.
C. From Schematic Planning to Coordinated Cooperation
Schema structures gathered from sensorimotor experiences
can be embedded into hierarchical, context-based planning.
Human cognition, however, is highly interactive and social. To
enable our architecture to act in multi-agent scenarios, it has to
(i) recognize other agents as individual actors (ii) observe and
learn about their actions and abilities, (iii) consider them as
actors in own plans (iv) consider them as possible interaction
targets, and (v) communicate emerging plans. Since agents
may have different knowledge and scopes of action, this can
already result in simple cooperative behavior, for example, if
the destruction of a specific block is needed but in the scope
of action of another agent only.
To yield a greater variety of cooperative scenarios, we addi-
tionally equip the agents with individual abilities. Specifically,
agents are equipped with different jumping heights or the
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unique ability to destroy specific blocks. As shown in Figure
2, the agents may then expand their scope of action when
considering interactions with other agents during schematic
planning. As a consequence, depending on the situation, agents
may be committed to include other agents into their plans, as
will be shown in the experiments.
While these principles are sufficient to model cooperative
planning, additional mechanisms are needed to account for
the coordination and communication of plans. In our imple-
mentation, all schematic plans are strictly sequential, meaning
that only one interaction by one agent is targeted at a time,
eliminating the need for a time-dependent execution of plans.
The communication of plans is done via the speech system
by communicating (grammatical tags corresponding to) the
planned, abstract, schematic interaction sequences from the
planning agent to possibly involved agents. Neither the con-
crete, contextualized interaction sequence, nor corresponding
sensorimotor plans are communicated. As a consequence,
the addressed agent has to infer the concrete instances of
targeted objects that the planning agent is talking about. To do
so, the agent performs contextual replanning to comprehend
the proposed plan using his own knowledge – essentially
mentally reenacting it. Given that the involved agent has
learned a different set of knowledge than the planning agent,
it is likely to end up with a different plan and a different
overall probability of success. In our current implementation,
an involved agent accepts a proposed plan when it does not
have another solution for the targeted goal that is more likely
successful than the proposed plan given its knowledge. Given
the involved agent gets to a different plan, it makes a counter
proposal that is always accepted by the initial planning agent.
The process of negotiation is shown in Figure 3.
Makes plan to reach 
a goal event
Start sensorimotor 
planning
Contextual replanning
Counterproposal of plan
Propose plan to
involved agent
plan includes another agent?         no    
       
       
       
                                                    yes
● Application of own knowledge
● Schema degeneralization
● Plan probability comparison
Start sensorimotor 
planning
           yes                          accept plan
no                                 
Start sensorimotor 
planning
accept plan
Fig. 3. Negotiation diagram for two agents. Blue boxes: Tasks of the planning
agent. Red boxes: Tasks of an agent involved in the initial plan. Grey boxes:
Both agents are planning.
III. EVALUATION
We evaluated the resulting cooperative capabilities of SEM-
LINCS by creating exemplar scenarios in the Super Mario
world, which illustrate the cooperative abilities of the agents.
We show two particular, illustrative evaluations. However,
we have evaluated SEMLINCS in various, similar scenarios
and have observed the unfolding of similarly well-coordinated
behavior. Videos showcasing these scenarios are available on-
line45. An additional scenario showing the negotiation process
is also available, but it is not included in this paper because
it is not the main focus here 6.
A. Toad Transports Mario
The first scenario is shown in Figure 5. In the initial scene
(top left picture), the agent ‘Mario’ stands on the left, below
an object named ‘simple block’ while the agent ‘Toad’ stands
close to Mario to the right side. Neither Mario nor Toad have
gathered schematic knowledge about their environment so far.
Mario is instructed to jump and learns that if he is in his ‘large’
health state and collides with a simple block from the bottom,
the block will be destroyed. Next, he is ordered to jump to
the right– essentially onto the top of Toad – resulting in Toad
carrying Mario and the learning of the option to ‘mount’ Toad
and thus be carried around. As Mario is instructed to jump to
the right again, he also learns how to dismount Toad. Figure 4
shows a graph of Mario’s schematic knowledge at this point.
Effect
DESTRUCTION
of simple block
Interaction
Collision from below
with simple block
Preconditions
Health: Large
Actor / Target
Actor: Mario 
Target: Simple Block
P = 1.0
Actor / Target
Actor: Mario 
Target: Toad
Interaction
Collision from above
with Toad
Effect
MOUNT
the agent Toad
P = 0.6
Interaction
Collision from left
with Toad
Effect
DISMOUNT
the agent Toad
P = 0.6
Fig. 4. Mario’s schematic knowledge in scenario 1. The respective entries
are put into context by the schematic planning module.
Equipped with this knowledge, Mario is ordered by voice
input to ‘destroy a simple block’. This sets as goal effect the
destruction of a simple block object which activates planning
in the schematic knowledge space. As can be seen in Figure 5,
the only simple block is located at the top right in the current
context. In this implemented scenario, Toad is able to jump
higher than Mario, such that he can jump to the elevation,
while Mario is not able to do so. Thus, a direct interaction
with the simple block is not possible for Mario as it is not in
Mario’s current scope of action.
The schematic planning is thus forced to consider other pre-
viously experienced interactions in the context of the current
situation. We assume that all agents have full knowledge about
the sensorimotor abilities of the others. Thus, inferring that it
will expand his scope of action, Mario simulates to jump on
the back of Toad, followed by Toad transporting Mario to the
elevated location on the right. Because the combined height of
Mario and Toad is too tall to pass through the narrow passage
where the simple block is located, a dismount interaction is
simulated subsequently. Finally, Mario is able to destroy the
simple block since it is now in his scope of action.
This interaction plan is then negotiated between the two
agents before they start sensorimotor planning. As Toad ob-
served Mario and thus learned the same knowledge entries, he
4Scenario 1: https://youtu.be/0zle8L6H- 4
5Scenario 2: https://youtu.be/WzOg WcNDik
6Additional Scenario: https://youtu.be/7RV4QCwDK8U
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Fig. 5. Senario 1: Toad helps Mario to destroy a block.
infers the same schematic plan and thus considers the proposal
useful and accepts. After the agreement, both agents plan
their part of the interaction sequence in terms of keystrokes
(top right picture) and wait for the other agent to execute its
part when necessary. The resulting execution of the plan is
shown in the following pictures: Mario mounting Toad; Toad
transporting Mario to the elevated ground; Mario dismounting
Toad and finally Mario moving to the simple block and
destroying it.
B. Mario Clears a Path for Toad
In the second scenario, shown in Figure 6, Toad is at first
instructed to collect the coin object, while Mario is ordered
to destroy the simple block (see top left picture). We assume
that Toad is not able to destroy a simple block by himself,
and does not generalize that he can do so as well. Toad is
instructed to increase his number of coins (top right picture).
Although he knows that a collision with a coin will yield the
desired effect, there is no coin inside his scope of action, since
the only coin in the scene is blocked by a simple block. Thus,
the schematic planning module anticipates a destruction of
the simple block by Mario (bottom left picture), expanding
Toad’s scope of action. After that, Toad is able to collect the
coin (bottom right picture).
Both shown scenarios demonstrate how SEMLINCS agents
are able to learn about each other, include each other in their
action plans by recognizing individual scopes of action in an
environmental context, and coordinate the joint execution of
the plans. Communicating cooperative goals to the participat-
Fig. 6. Scenario 2: Mario helps Toad to collect a coin.
ing agents establishes a common ground, consisting of the
final goal an agent wants to achieve as well as the interactions
it plans to execute while pursuing the final goal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Humans are able to understand other agents as individual,
intentional agents, who have their own knowledge, beliefs,
perspectives, abilities, motivations, intentions, and so their
own mind. [24]–[26]. Furthermore, we are able to cooperate
with others highly flexibly and context-dependently, which
requires coordination. This coordination can be supported by
communication, helping to establish a common ground about
a joint interaction goal.
In the presented work, we showed how social cooperative
skills can be realized in artificial agents. To do so, we equipped
the agents with different behavioral skills, such that particular
goals could only be reached with the help of another agent.
To coordinate a required joint action, SEMLINCS had to
enable agents to learn about the capabilities of other agents by
observing other agent-environment interactions and to assign
the learned event schema rules to particular agents. Moreover,
our implementation shows how procedural rules can be applied
to a local, environmental context, and how sensorimotor and
more abstract schematic forward simulations can be distin-
guished in this process, and applied to build an effective, hier-
archical planning structure. Besides the computational insights
into the necessary system enhancements, our implementation
opens new opportunities for future developments towards even
more social, cooperative, artificial cognitive systems.
First of all, currently the agents always cooperate. A con-
ditional cooperation could be based on the creation of an
incentive for an agent to share its reward with the participating
partner agent. Indeed, it has been shown that a sense of fairness
in terms of sharing rewards when team play was necessary is
a uniquely human ability [27]. While a sense of fairness is a
motivation to share when help was provided – or also possibly
when future help is expected, that is, expecting that the partner
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will return the favor – a more long term motivation can create
social bonds by monitoring social interactions with partners
over time and preferring interactions and cooperations with
those partners that have shared rewards in the past in a fair
manner. Clearly many factors determine if one is willing to
cooperate, including social factors, game theory factors, and
related aspects – all of which take the expected own effort
into account, the expected effort of the cooperating other(s),
as well as the expected personal gain and the gain for the
others.
It also needs to be noted that currently action plans are
executed in a strict, sequential manner. In the real world,
however, joint actions are typically executed concurrently,
such as when preparing dinner together [25]. Thus, in the
near future we will face the challenge to allow the parallel
execution of cooperative interactions, which will make the
timing partially much more critical.
Although our agents already communicate plans on an
abstract, schematic level, all sequential steps of the plans need
to be fully verbalized in order to coordinate a joint action
at the moment. An alternative would be to simply utter the
goal and ask for help, thus expecting the other agent to help
under consideration of the known behavioral abilities of the
individual agent. Therefore, more elaborate theories of mind
would need to be taken into consideration [28]. For example,
in the first scenario mentioned above, Toad may realize that
he needs to transport Mario to the higher ground on the
right to enable Mario to destroy the box up there, because
Mario cannot reach this area. Humans are clearly able to
utter or even only manually signal a current goal and still
come up with a joint plan, without verbally communicating
the plan in detail. While verbal communication certainly helps
in the coordination process, obvious interactions can also un-
fold successfully without communication (e.g. letting another
pedestrian pass; passing an object out of reach of another
person, who apparently needs it). Although the Mario world
is rather simple, cooperative interactions of this kind could
actually be enabled when enhancing the current SEMLINCS
architecture with the option to simulate potential goals of the
other agent and plans on how to reach them, thus offering a
helping hand wherever it seems necessary.
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Representational Limits in Cognitive Architectures 
Abstract—This paper proposes a focused analysis on some 
problematic aspects concerning the knowledge level in General 
Cognitive Architectures (CAs). In particular, it addresses the 
problems regarding both the limited size and the homogeneous 
typology of the encoded (and processed) conceptual knowledge. 
As a possible way out to face, jointly, these problems, this 
contribution discusses the possibility of integrating external, but 
architecturally compliant, cognitive systems into the knowledge 
representation and processing mechanisms of the CAs.  
Keywords—cognitive architectures, knowledge representation, 
knowledge level, common-sense reasoning. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The research on Cognitive Architectures (CAs) is a wide 
and active area involving a plethora of disciplines such as 
Cognitive Science, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and, more 
recently, the area of Computational Neuroscience. CAs have 
been historically introduced i) “to capture, at the computational 
level, the invariant mechanisms of human cognition, including 
those underlying the functions of control, learning, memory, 
adaptivity, perception and action” [1] and ii) to reach human 
level intelligence, also called General Artificial Intelligence, by 
means of the realization of artificial artifacts built upon them. 
During the last decades many cognitive architectures have been 
realized, - such as ACT-R [2], SOAR [3] etc. - and have been 
widely tested in several cognitive tasks involving learning, 
reasoning, selective attention, multimodal perception, 
recognition etc. Despite the recent developments, however, in 
the last decades the importance of the “knowledge level” [4] 
has been historically and systematically downsized by this 
research area, whose interests have been mainly based on the 
analysis and the development of mechanisms and the processes 
governing human and (artificial) cognition. The knowledge 
level in CAs, however, presents several problems that may 
affect the overall heuristic and epistemological value of such 
artificial general systems and therefore deserves more 
attention.  
II. TWO PROBLEMS FOR THE KNOWLEDGE LEVEL IN CAS
Handling a huge amount of knowledge, and selectively 
retrieve it according to the needs emerging in different 
situational scenarios, represents an important aspect of human 
intelligence. For this task humans adopt a wide range of 
heuristics [5] due to their “bounded rationality” [6]. Currently, 
however, the Cognitive Architectures are not able, de facto, to 
deal with complex knowledge structures that can be even 
slightly comparable to the knowledge heuristically managed by 
humans. In other terms: CAs are general structures without a 
general content. This means that the knowledge embedded and 
processed in such architectures is usually very limited, ad-hoc 
built, domain specific, or based on the specific tasks they have 
to deal with. Thus, every evaluation of the artificial systems 
relying upon them, is necessarily task-specific and do not 
involve not even the minimum part of the full spectrum of 
processes involved in the human cognition when the 
“knowledge” comes to play a role. As a consequence, the 
structural mechanisms that the CAs implement concerning 
knowledge processing tasks (e.g. that ones of retrieval, 
learning, reasoning etc.) can be only loosely evaluated, and 
compared w.r.t. that ones used by humans in similar 
knowledge-intensive situations. In other words: from an 
epistemological perspective, the explanatory power of their 
computational simulation is strongly affected [7,8]. Such 
knowledge limitation, in our opinion, does not allow to obtain 
significant advancements in the cognitive science research 
about how the humans heuristically select and deal with the 
huge amount of knowledge that possess when they have to 
make decisions, reason about a given situation or, more in 
general, solve a particular cognitive task involving several 
dimensions of analysis. This problem, as a consequence, also 
limits the advancement of the research in the area of General 
Artificial Intelligence of cognitive inspiration.  
The “content” limit of the cognitive architectures has been 
recently pointed out in literature [1] and some technical 
solutions for filling this “knowledge gap” have been proposed 
[9]. In particular the use of ontologies and of semantic 
formalisms and resources (such as DBPedia) has been seen as a 
possible solution for providing effective content to the 
structural knowledge modules of the cognitive architectures. 
Some initial efforts have been done in this sense but cover only 
part of the “knowledge problem” in CAs (i.e. the one 
concerning the limited “size” of the adopted knowledge bases). 
However, also these solutions, do not address another relevant 
aspect affecting the knowledge level of CAs: namely, the 
problem concerning the “knowledge homogeneity” issue. In 
other terms: the type of knowledge represented and 
manipulated by most CAs (including those provided with 
extended knowledge modules) is usually homogeneous in 
nature. It mainly covers, in fact, only the so called “classical” 
part of conceptual information (that one representing concepts 
in terms of necessary and sufficient information and compliant 
with ontological semantics (see [10]) on these aspects). On the 
other hand, the so called “common-sense” conceptual 
components of our knowledge (i.e. those that, based on the 
results from the cognitive science, allow to characterize 
concepts in terms of “prototypes”, “exemplars” or “theories”) 
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is largely absent in such computational frameworks. The 
possibility of representing and handling, in an integrated way, 
an heterogeneous amount of common sense conceptual 
representations (and the related reasoning mechanisms), in fact, 
is not sufficiently addressed both by the symbolic-based 
“chunk-structures” adopted by the most common general CAs 
(e.g. SOAR) and by fully connectionist architectures (e.g. 
LEABRA). This aspect is problematic also in the hybrid 
solutions adopted by CAs such as CLARION [11] or ACT-R 
(the different reasons leading to a non satisfactory treatment of 
this aspect are detailed in [12]). This type of knowledge, 
however, is exactly the type of “cognitive information” 
crucially used by humans for heuristic reasoning and decision 
making. This paper presents an analysis of the current situation 
by proposing a comparison of the representational level of 
SOAR, ACT-R, CLARION and Vector-LIDA. Finally, we 
suggest that a possible way out to deal with this problem could 
be represented by the integration of external cognitive systems 
into the knowledge representation and processing mechanisms 
of  general cognitive architectures. Some initial efforts in this 
direction, have been proposed (see e.g. [13, 14]) and will be 
presented and discussed. 
III. KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION IN CAS 
In the following we provide a short overview of: SOAR [3], 
ACT-R [2], CLARION [11] and LIDA [15] (in its novel 
version known as Vector-LIDA [16]). The choice of these 
architecture has been based on the fact that they represent some 
of the most widely used systems (adopted in scenarios ranging 
from robotics to video-games) and their representational 
structures present some relevant differentiations that are 
interesting to investigate in the light of the issues raised in this 
paper. By analyzing, in brief, such architectures we will 
exclusively focus on the description of their representational 
frameworks since a more comprehensive review of their whole 
mechanisms is out of the scope of the present contribution 
(detailed reviews of their mechanisms are described in [17]; 
and [18]). We will show how all of them are affected, at 
different levels of granularity, by both the size and the 
knowledge homogeneity problems. 
A. SOAR 
SOAR is one of the oldest cognitive architectures. This 
system was considered by Newell a candidate for a Unified 
Theory of Cognition [19]. One of the main themes in SOAR is 
that all cognitive tasks can be represented by problem spaces 
that are searched by production rules grouped into operators. 
These production rules are red in parallel to produce reasoning 
cycles. From a representational perspective, SOAR exploits 
symbolic representations of knowledge (called chunks) and use 
pattern matching to select relevant knowledge elements. 
Basically, where a production match the contents of declarative 
(working) memory the rule fires and then the content from the 
declarative memory (called Semantic Memory in SOAR) is 
retrieved. This system adheres strictly to the Newell and 
Simon's physical symbol system hypothesis which assumes 
that symbolic processing is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for intelligent behavior. The SOAR system encounter, in 
general, the standard problems affecting symbolic formalisms 
at the representational level: it is not well equipped to deal with 
common-sense knowledge representation and reasoning (since 
approximate comparisons are hard and computationally 
intensive to implement with graph-like representations), and, as 
a consequence, the typology of encoded knowledge is biased 
towards the ``classical" (but unsatisfactory) representation of 
concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions [10]. 
This characterization, however, is problematic for modelling 
real world concepts and, on the other hand, the so called 
common-sense knowledge components (i.e. those that, allow to 
characterize and process conceptual information in terms of 
typicality and involving, for example, prototypical and 
exemplar based representations and reasoning mechanisms) is 
largely absent. This problem arises despite the fact that the 
chunks in SOAR can be represented as a sort of frame-like 
structures containing some common-sense (e.g. prototypical) 
information [12]. W.r.t. to the size problem, the SOAR 
knowledge level is also problematic. SOAR agents, in fact, are 
not endowed with general knowledge and only process ad-hoc 
built (or task-specific learned) symbolic knowledge structures. 
B. ACT-R 
ACT-R is a cognitive architectures explicitly inspired by 
theories and experimental results coming from human 
cognition. Here the cognitive mechanisms concerning the 
knowledge level emerge from the interaction of two types of 
knowledge: declarative knowledge, that encodes explicit facts 
that the system knows, and procedural knowledge, that encodes 
rules for processing declarative knowledge. In particular, the 
declarative module is used to store and retrieve pieces of 
information (called chunks, featured by a type and a set of 
attribute-value pairs, similar to frame slots) in the declarative 
memory. ACT-R employs a wide range of sub-symbolic 
processes for the activation of symbolic conceptual chunks 
representing the encoded knowledge. Finally, the central 
production system connects these modules by using a set of IF-
THEN production rules using a set of IF-THEN production 
rules. Differently from SOAR, ACT-R allows to represent the 
information in terms of prototypes and exemplars and allow to 
perform, selectively, either prototype or exemplar-based 
categorization. This means that this architecture allows the 
modeller to manually specify which kind of categorization 
strategy to employ according to his specific needs. Such 
architecture, however, only partially addresses the 
homogeneity problem since it does not allow to represent, 
jointly, these different types of common-sense representations 
for the same conceptual entity (i.e. it does not assume a 
heterogeneous perspective). As a consequence, it is also not 
able to autonomously decide which of the corresponding 
reasoning procedures to activate (e.g. prototypes or exemplars) 
and to provide a framework able to manage the interaction of 
such different reasoning strategies (however its overall 
architectural environment provides, at least in principle, the 
possibility of implementing cascade reasoning processes 
triggering one another). Even if, in such architecture, some 
attempts exist concerning the design of harmonization 
strategies between different types of common-sense conceptual 
categorizations (e.g. exemplars-based and rule based, see [20]) 
however they do not handle the problem concerning the 
interaction of the prototype or exemplars-based processes 
according to the results coming from the experimental 
cognitive science (for example: the old item effect, privileging 
exemplars w.r.t. prototypes is not modelled. See again [12] for 
a detailed analysis of this aspect). Summing up: w.r.t. the 
knowledge homogeneity problem, the components needed to 
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fully reconcile the Heterogeneity approach with ACT-R are 
present, however they have not been fully exploited yet. 
Regarding the size problem: as for SOAR, ACT-R agents are 
usually equipped with task-specic knowledge and not with 
general cross-domain knowledge. In this respect some relevant 
attempts to overcome this limitation have been recently done 
by extending the Declarative Memory of the architecture. They 
will be discussed in section E along with their current 
implications. 
C. CLARION 
   CLARION is a hybrid cognitive architecture based on the 
dual-process theory of mind. From a representational 
perspective, processes are mainly subject to the activity of two 
sub-systems, the Action Centered Sub-system (ACS) and the 
Non-Action Centered Sub-system (NACS). Both sub-systems 
store information using a two-layered architecture, i.e., they 
both include an explicit  and an implicit  level of 
representation. Each top-level chunk node is represented by a 
set of (micro)features in the bottom level (i.e., a distributed 
representation). The (micro)features (in the bottom level) are 
connected to the chunk nodes (in the top level) so that they can 
be activated together through bottom-up or top-down 
activation. Therefore, in general, a chunk is represented by 
both levels: using a chunk node at the top level and distributed 
feature representation at the bottom level. W.r.t. to the 
knowledge size and homogeneity problems, CLARION, 
encounter problems with both these aspects since i) there are 
no available attempts aiming at endowing such architecture 
with a general and cross-domain knowledge ii) the dual-layered 
conceptual information does not provide the possibility of 
encoding (manually or automatically via learning cycles) the 
information in terms of the heterogeneous classes of 
representations presented in the section 2. In particular: the 
main problematic aspect concerns the representation of the 
common-sense knowledge components. As for SOAR and 
ACT-R, also in CLARION the possible co-existence of typical 
representations in terms of prototypes, exemplars and theories 
(and the interaction among them) is not treated. In terms of 
reasoning strategies, notwithstanding that the implicit 
knowledge layer based on neural network representations can 
provide forms of non monotonic reasoning (e.g. based on 
similarity), such kind of similarity-based reasoning is currently 
not grounded on the mechanisms guiding the decision choices 
followed, for example, by prototype or exemplars-based 
reasoning. 
D. Vector-LIDA 
Vector LIDA is a cognitive architecture employing, at the 
representational level, high-dimensional vectors and reduced 
descriptions. High-dimensional vector spaces have interesting 
properties that make them attractive for representations in 
cognitive models. The distribution of the distances between 
vectors in these spaces, and the huge number of possible 
vectors, allow noise-robust representations where the distance 
between vectors can be used to measure the similarity (or 
dissimilarity) of the concepts they represent. Moreover, these 
high-dimensional vectors can be used to represent complex 
structures, where each vector denotes an element in the 
structure. However, a single vector can also represent one of 
these same complex structures in its entirety by implementing a 
reduced description, a mechanism to encode complex 
hierarchical structures in vectors or connectionist models. 
These reduced description vectors can be expanded to obtain 
the whole structure, and can be used directly for complex 
calculations and procedures, such as making analogies, logical 
inference, or structural comparison. Vectors in this framework 
are treated as symbol-like representations, thus enabling 
different kind of operations executed on them (e.g. simple 
forms of compositionality via vectors blending). Vector- LIDA, 
encounters the same limitations of the other CAs since i) its 
agents are not equipped with a general cross-domain 
knowledge and therefore can be only used in very narrow tasks 
(their knowledge structure is either ad hoc build or ad hoc 
learned). Additionally, this architecture does not address the 
problem concerning the heterogeneity of the knowledge 
typologies. In particular its knowledge level does not represent 
the common-sense knowledge components such as prototypes 
and exemplars (and the related reasoning strategies). In fact, as 
for CLARION, despite vector-representations allow to perform 
many kind of approximate comparisons and similarity-based 
reasoning (e.g. in tasks such as categorization), the peculiarity 
concerning prototype or exemplars based representations 
(along with the the design of the interaction between their 
different reasoning strategies) are not provided. In this respect, 
however an element that is worth-noting is represented by the 
fact that the Vector-LIDA representational structures are very 
close to the framework of Conceptual Spaces. Conceptual 
Spaces are a geometric knowledge representation framework 
proposed by Peter Gärdenfors [21]. They can be thought as a 
particular class of vector representations where knowledge is 
represented as a set of quality dimensions, and where a 
geometrical structure is associated to each quality dimension. 
They are discussed in more detail in section 5. The 
convergence of the Vector-LIDA representation towards 
Conceptual Spaces could enable, in such architecture, the 
possibility of dealing with at least prototype and exemplars-
based representations and reasoning, thus overcoming the 
knowledge homogeneity problem.
E. Attempts to Overcome the Knowledge Limits 
   As mentioned above, some initial efforts to deal with the 
limited knowledge availability for agents endowed with 
cognitive architecture have been done. In particular, within 
Mind'sEye program (a DARPA founded project), the 
knowledge layers of ACT-R architecture have been 
semantically extended with an external ontological content 
coming from three integrated semantic resources composed by 
the lexical databases WordNet [22], FrameNet [23] and by a 
branch of the top level ontology DOLCE [24] related to the 
event modelling. In this case, the amount of semantic 
knowledge selected for the realization of the Cognitive Engine 
(one of the systems developed within the MindEye Program) 
and for its evaluation, despite by far larger w.r.t. the standard 
ad-hoc solutions, was tailored on the specific needs of the 
system itself. It, in fact, was aimed at solving a precise task of 
event recognition trough a video-surveillance intelligent 
machinery; therefore only the ontological knowledge about the 
events was selectively embedded in it. While this is a 
reasonable approach in an applicative context, still does not 
allow to test the general cognitive mechanisms of a Cognitive 
Architecture on a general, multi faceted and multi-domain, 
knowledge. Therefore it does not allow to evaluate strictu 
sensu to what extent the designed heuristics allowing to 
retrieve and process, from a massive and composite knowledge 
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base, conceptual knowledge can be considered satisfyicing 
w.r.t. the human performances. More recent works have tried to 
completely overcome at least the size problem of the 
knowledge level. To this class of works belongs that one 
proposed by Salvucci [9] aiming at enriching the knowledge 
model of the Declarative Memory of ACT-R with a world-level 
knowledge base such as DBpedia (i.e. the semantic version of 
Wikipedia represented in terms of ontological formalisms) and 
a previous one proposed in [25] presenting an integration of the 
ACT-R Declarative and Procedural Memory with the Cyc 
ontology [26] (one of the widest ontological resources 
currently available containing more than 230,000 concepts). 
Both the wide-coverage integrated ontological resources, 
however, represents conceptual information in terms of 
symbolic structures and encounter the standard problems 
affecting this class of formalisms and discussed above. Some 
of these limitations can be, in principle, partially overcome by 
such works, since the integration of such wide-coverage 
ontological knowledge bases with the ACT-R Declarative 
Memory allows to preserve the possibility of using the 
common-sense conceptual processing mechanisms available in 
that architecture (e.g. prototype and exemplars based). 
Therefore, in principle, dealing with the size problem also 
allows to address some aspects concerning the heterogeneity 
problem. Still, however, remains the problem concerning the 
lack of the representation of common-sense information to 
which such common-sense architectural processes can be 
applied: e.g. a conceptual retrieval based on prototypical traits 
(i.e. a prototype-based categorization) cannot be performed on 
such integrated ontological knowledge bases since these 
symbolic systems do not represent at all the typical information 
associated to a given concept ([12] presents an experiment on 
this aspect). In addition, as already mentioned, it remains not 
yet addressed the problem concerning the interaction, in a 
general and principled way, of the different types of common-
sense processes involving different representations of the same 
conceptual entity. In the light of the arguments presented above 
it can be argued, therefore, that the current proposed solutions 
for dealing with the knowledge problems in CAs are not 
completely satisfactory. In particular, the integrations with 
huge world-level ontological knowledge bases can be 
considered a necessary solution for solving size problem. It is, 
however, insufficient for dealing with the knowledge 
homogeneity problem and with the integration of the common-
sense conceptual mechanisms activated on heterogeneous 
bodies of knowledge, as assumed in the heterogeneous 
representational perspective. In the next sections we outline a 
possible alternative solution that, despite being not yet fully 
developed is, in perspective, suitable to account for both for the 
heterogeneous aspects in conceptualization and for the size 
problems.   
IV. INTEGRATING EXTERNAL COGNITIVE SYSTEMS IN CA
Recently some available conceptual categorization systems, 
explicitly assuming the heterogeneous representational 
hypothesis and integrated with wide-coverage knowledge bases 
(such as Cyc) have been developed and integrated with the 
knowledge level of available CAs. For our purposes, we will 
consider here the DUAL PECCS system [13, 14]. We will not 
discuss the results obtained by such system in tasks of 
conceptual categorization, since they have been already 
presented elsewhere [14]. We shall briefly focus, in the 
following, on the representational level of the system.   
The knowledge level of DUAL PECCS is heterogeneous in 
nature since it is explicitly based and designed on the 
assumption that concepts are “heterogeneous proxytypes” [27] 
and, as such, they are composed by heterogeneous knowledge 
components selectively and contextually activated in working 
memory. In particular, by following the proposal presented in 
[28, 29], the representational level of DUAL PECCS couples 
Conceptual Spaces representations and ontological knowledge 
(consisting in the Cyc ontology) for the same conceptual entity. 
Conceptual Spaces [21] is used to represent and process the 
common-sense conceptual information. In such framework, to 
each quality dimension is associated a geometrical (topological 
or metrical) structure. In some cases, such dimensions can be 
directly related to perceptual mechanisms; examples of this 
kind are temperature, weight, brightness, pitch. In other cases, 
dimensions can be more abstract in nature. In this setting, 
concepts correspond to convex regions, and regions with 
different geometrical properties correspond to different sorts of 
concepts [21]. Here, prototypes and prototypical reasoning 
have a natural geometrical interpretation: prototypes 
correspond to the geometrical centre of a convex region (the 
centroid). Also exemplars-based representation can be 
represented as points in a multidimensional space, and their 
similarity can be computed as the intervening distance between 
each two points, based on some suitable metrics (such as 
Euclidean and Manhattan distance etc.). The ontological 
component, on the other hand, is used to provide and process 
the “classical” knowledge component for the same conceptual 
entity.  
The representational level of DUAL PECCS (and the 
corresponding knowledge processing mechanisms) has been 
successfully integrated with the representational counterpart of 
some available CAs [14, 30] by extending, de facto, the 
knowledge representation and processing capabilities of 
cognitive architectures based on diverse representational 
assumptions.   One of the main novelties introduced by DUAL 
PECCS (and therefore one of the main advantages obtained by 
the CAs extended with such external cognitive system) consists 
in the fact that it is explicitly designed the flow of interaction 
between common-sense categorization processes (based on 
prototypes and exemplars and operating on conceptual spaces 
representations) and the standard deductive processes 
(operating on the ontological conceptual component). The 
harmonization regarding such different classes of mechanisms 
has been devised based on the tenets coming from the dual 
process theory of reasoning [31, 32]. Additionally, in DUAL 
PECCS, also the interaction of the categorization processes 
occurring within the class of non monotonic categorization 
mechanisms (i.e. prototypes and exemplars-based 
categorization) has been devised and is dealt with at the 
Conceptual Spaces level. This latter aspect is of particular 
interest in the light of the multifaceted problem concerning the 
heterogeneity of the encoded knowledge. In fact, since the 
design of the interaction of the the different processes operating 
with heterogeneous representations still represents, as seen 
before, a largely unaddressed problem in current CAs, this 
system shows the relative easiness that its knowledge 
framework (and, in particular, the Conceptual Spaces 
component) provides to naturally model the dynamics between 
prototype and exemplars-based processes. For what concerns 
the size problem, finally, the possibile grounding of the 
Conceptual Spaces representational component with symbolic 
structures enables the integration with wide-coverage 
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knowledge bases such as Cyc. Thus, the solution adopted in 
DUAL PECCS is, in principle, able to deal with both the size 
and the knowledge homogeneity problems affecting the CAs. 
In particular, the extension of the Declarative Memories of the 
current CAs with this external cognitive system allowed to 
empower the knowledge processing and categorization 
capabilities of such general architectures (an important role, in 
this respect, is played by the Conceptual Spaces component). 
Despite there is still room of improvements and further 
investigations, this seems a promising way to deal with the 
both the knowledge problems discussed in this paper. 
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Abstract— Visual perception is one of the most advanced function 
of human brain. The study of different aspects of human 
perception currently contributes to machine vision applications. 
Humans estimate the size of objects to grasp them by perceptual 
mechanisms. However, the motor system is also able to influence 
the perception system. Here, we found modifications of object 
size perception after a reaching and a grasping action in different 
contextual information. This mechanism can be described by the 
Bayesian model where action provides the likelihood and this 
latter is integrated with the expected size (prior) derived from the 
stored object experience (Forward Dynamic Model). Beyond the 
action-modulation effect, the knowledge of subsequent action 
type modulates the perceptual responses shaping them according 
to relevant information required to recognize and interact with 
objects. Cognitive architectures can be improved on the basis of 
these processings in order to amplify relevant features of objects 
and allow to robot/agent an easy interaction with them.     
Keywords—visual perception, object recognition, motor output, 
human functions, context information.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The majority of machine vision and object recognition 
systems today apply mechanistic or deterministic template 
matching, edge detection or color scanning approach for 
identifying different objects in the space and also to guide 
embodied artificial intelligent systems to interaction with 
them. However, fine disturbances in the workspace of a robot 
can lead to failures, and thus slow down their performance in 
identification, recognition, learning and adapting to noisy 
environment, compared to human brain. To go beyond these 
limitations robots with intelligent behavior must be provided 
with a processing architecture that allows them to learn and 
reason about responses to complex goals in a complex world.  
The starting point for the development of such intelligent 
systems is the study of human behavior. Humans frequently 
estimate the size of objects to grasp them. In fact, when 
performing an action, our perception is focused towards object 
visual properties that enable us to execute the action 
successfully. However, the motor system is also able to 
influence perception, but only few studies reported evidence 
for action-induced visual perception modifications related to 
hand movements [1–4]. For example, the orientation 
perception is enhanced during preparation of grasping action 
compared with a pointing for which object orientation is not 
important [5,6]. This “enhanced perception” is triggered by the 
intention to grasp and is important to examine objects with the 
maximum possible accuracy. If we consider the effects of 
action execution on visual perception of object features, there 
is ample evidence for visual perception changes in the 
oculomotor system, but little is known about the perceptual 
changes induced by different types of hand movements. In 
order to evaluate the influence of different hand movement on 
visual perception, we tested a feature-specific modulation on 
object size perception after a reaching and a grasping action in 
different contexts.  
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS
A total of 16 right-handed subjects (11 females and 5 males, 
ages 21–40 years; with normal or corrected-to-normal vision) 
took part in the experiment. The experiment was performed by 
two groups of participants. One group of 8 subjects performed 
the Prior knowledge of action type experiment (PK condition) 
and the other group (8 participants) performed the No prior 
knowledge of action type (NPK condition). All subjects were 
naive to the experimental purpose of the study and gave 
informed consent to participate in the experiment. Procedures 
were approved by the Bioethical Committee of the University 
of Bologna and were in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki.  
A. Apparatus and Setup 
Participants were seated in an environment with dim 
background lighting and viewed a touchscreen monitor (ELO 
IntelliTouch, 1939L), which displayed target stimuli within a 
visible display of 37.5 X 30.0 cm. To stabilize head position, 
the participants placed their heads on a chin rest located 43 cm 
from the screen, which resulted in a visual field of 50 x 40 
deg. The display had a resolution of 1152 X 864 pixels and a 
frame rate of 60 Hz (15,500 touch points/cm2). For stimulus 
presentation, we used MATLAB (The MathWorks) with the 
Psychophysics toolbox extension [7]. The stimuli were white, 
red and green dots with a radius of 1.5 mm and 10 differently 
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sized white, red and green bars all 9 mm large and whose 
length was: 30, 33.6, 37.2, 40.8, 44.4, 48, 51.6, 55.2, 58.8, 
62.4 mm. Hand position was measured by a motion capture 
system (VICON, 460; frequency of acquisition 100 Hz), 
which follows the trajectory of the hand in three dimensions 
by recording infrared light reflection on passive markers.  
Participants performed 10 blocks of 10 trials each. Each trial 
consisted of three successive phases: Pre-size perception, 
Reaching or Grasping movement, Post-size perception (Fig. 
1). In Pre-size perception and Post-size perception phases 
(phases 1 and 3), a white or green central fixation target stayed 
on the screen for 1 s; then, a white or green bar was presented, 
for 1 s, 12 deg on the left or on the right side of the central 
fixation target and, after an acoustic signal, it disappeared. The 
participants were required to manually indicate the perceived 
horizontal size of the bar. All participants indicated the bar 
sizes by keeping the hand within the starting hand position 
square and the distance between subject eyes. In the Reaching 
or Grasping movement phase (phase 2), after 1 s, the white or 
green central fixation point was followed by a bar identical for 
position and size to that of phases 1 and 3. Participants were 
required to perform a reaching (closed fist) or grasping action 
(extension of thumb and index fingers to “grasp” the 
extremities of the bar) towards the bar after the acoustic 
signal, respectively. The type of actions was instructed by the 
colors of the stimuli (fixation point and bar). In fact, if the 
color of the stimuli was white, participants were required to 
perform a reaching movement whereas, if the color was green, 
they were required to perform a grasping movement. In PK 
condition, the color of fixation points and bars was white or 
green in all three phases of trial and in this way the 
participants knew in advance (from phase 1) which action type 
was required in the movement phase (phase 2). In the NPK 
condition, the sequence of the three phases was identically 
structured as in the PK condition, but we changed colors of 
fixation points and bars from white/green to red in phases 1 
and 3. The color of stimuli during phase 2 remained white or 
green according to the movement type, reaching or grasping 
respectively. By this color manipulation, participants could not 
know in advance the successive action type.  
Fig. 1. Task sequence. Circle = fixation point, Rectangle = stimulus, Hand = 
size indication by manual report, Speaker = acoustic signal to respond.    
B. Data analysis 
After data collection, finger position data were interpolated at 
1000 Hz, then data were run though a fifth-order Butterworth 
low-pass filter [8]. For data processing and analysis, we wrote 
custom software in MATLAB to compute the distance 
between index and thumb markers during the pre- and post-
manual estimation phases. Grip aperture was calculated 
considering trial intervals in which the velocities of the index 
and thumb markers remained <5 mm/s [8]. Grip aperture was 
defined as maximum distance within this interval. To evaluate 
the effect of different hand movement on size perception, we 
compared the manual perceptual responses before the 
movements with those after the movements by using two-
tailed t-test with independent samples.  
To evaluate the magnitude of the effect of NPK and PK 
conditions on perceptual responses before the movement we 
calculated the average difference between the two responses 
and we compared the responses between the two conditions by 
a t-test analysis. We extracted relevant features from the 
perceptual responses before the movement and we used them 
to predict the NPK and PK conditions. For this purpose, we 
performed a linear-discriminant analysis (LDA-based 
classifier), as implemented in Statistics and Machine Learning 
toolbox (Matlab). Pre movement manual responses of NPK 
and PK conditions were vertically concatenated to build the 
feature space composed by 958 trials. Fivefold cross-
validation was performed by using the 80% of trials for 
training and the 20% for testing the data, so to ensure that the 
classifier was trained and tested on different data. Specifically, 
the classifier was trained on the training subset and the 
obtained optimal decision criteria was implemented on the 
testing subset. The prediction results were obtained for this 
testing subset. This procedure was repeated 5 times, so that all 
trials were tested and classified basing on models learned from 
the other trials. The prediction results for all the trials were 
taken together to give an averaged prediction result with 
standard deviation. We considered statistically significant the 
accuracies which standard deviations did not cross the 
theoretical chance level of 50%. We used a LDA classifier as 
decoder of the two conditions. LDA finds linear combination 
of features that characterizes or separates two or more classes 
of objects or event [9,10]. In fact, LDA explicitly attempts to 
model the difference between the classes of data. For all 
statistical analyses the significant criterion was set to P < 0.05. 
III. RESULTS
We assessed the effects of action execution on perceptual 
responses comparing the single subject responses before the 
movement with those after the movement and calculating the 
difference between these. Fig. 2 shows these differences in 
grey color for reaching movement on the horizontal axis 
compared with those of grasping movement on vertical axis. 
Filled and empty circles are referred to PK and NPK 
condition, respectively. The majority of subjects fell below the 
diagonal suggesting that they corrected the perceptual 
estimation after the grasping movements with respect to the 
reaching movement. In particular, they perceived significantly 
smaller the bars after a grasping movement with respect to a 
reaching movement (P < 0.05). The averaged differences in 
PK and NPK conditions are reported in Fig. 2 as black and 
white dots, respectively. Both dots are below the diagonal 
suggesting that, globally, subjects perceived smaller after a 
grasping action compared with a reaching action.  
To analyze the effect of the NPK and PK conditions on size 
perception, we focused the analyses on manual size reports 
before the movement execution (Pre size perception phase). 
We computed the difference between the Pre size perception 
reports in PK condition and the Pre size perception reports in 
NPK condition. This difference allowed to highlight the 
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amount of change in size perception in the two conditions 
tested. As it is shown in Fig. 3A, we found that the amount of 
change in reaching was -11.89 mm ±0.98 mm and in grasping  
-11.36 mm ±1.08 mm, and in both cases, they were 
significantly deviated from baseline (t-test, P < 0.05). 
Generally, the subjects tended to perceive smaller the sizes 
presented in the condition where they were aware about the 
subsequent action (PK condition) compared with the condition 
where they were uncertain about the successive movement 
(NPK condition). To evaluate whether the strength of this 
effect was due to a perceptual bias or to different neural 
processings, we used a LDA decoder to classify the manual 
responses according to the NPK and PK condition (see 
Material and Methods). In other words, we checked whether 
we were able to predict the PK and NPK conditions from 
perceptual responses before the movement execution, as this 
technique represents a powerful method to reconstruct 
experimental conditions and functional movements from 
neural responses using different types of classifiers [11,12]. 
Fig. 3A shows decoding results as confusion matrix and the 
corresponding mean accuracy expressed in percentage. We 
found a good correlation between the real conditions and the 
decoded conditions, as it is illustrated in Fig. 3B. The 
accuracies of decoding were significantly higher of 50% 
(66,8% for PK and 60.54% for NPK) as shown in Fig. 3C.  
Fig. 2. Differences between perceptual responses before and after the 
movement. Filled grey dots are differences in PK condition and empty grey 
dots are differences in NPK condition. Black and white dots are the mean 
differences in PK and NPK conditions, respectively. 
IV. DISCUSSION
In the present study, we found direct evidence for a perceptual 
modification of a relevant feature as object size before and 
after the execution of two types of hand movement. These 
changes depended on two factors: the knowledge of the 
subsequent action type and the type of action executed. 
Changes in perception were sharpened after a grasping action 
compared with a reaching. Specifically, subjects perceived 
objects smaller after a grasping movement than after a 
reaching movement. The study of action effects exerted by the 
skeletomotor system on perception has been focused on the 
evidence that relevant features of objects, such as size or 
orientation, prime the perceptual system in order to execute a 
more accurate subsequent grasping movement.  
Indeed, Gutteling et al. [5] demonstrated an increased 
perceptual sensitivity to object orientation during a grasping 
preparation phase. The effect of action-modulated perception 
has also been shown to facilitate visual search for orientation.  
Bekkering and Neggers [2] analysed the performance of 
subjects that were required to grasp or point to an object of a 
certain orientation and color among other objects. They 
demonstrated that fewer saccadic eye movements were made 
to wrong orientations when subjects had to grasp the object 
than point to it. Recently, Bayesian theory has been applied to 
formalize processes of cue and sensorimotor integration 
[13,14]. According to this view, the nervous system combines 
prior knowledge about object properties gained through 
former experience (prior) with current sensory cues 
(likelihood), to generate appropriate object properties 
estimations for action and perception. Hirsinger and 
coworkers [15], by application of a size-weight illusion 
paradigm, found that the combination of prior and likelihood 
for size perception were integrated in a Bayesian way. Their 
model consisted in a Forward Dynamic Model (FDM) that 
represented the stored object experience. The FDM output was 
the experience-based expected size and was referred as the 
prior. The prior then was integrated with the likelihood, which 
represented the afferent sensory information about object size. 
A feedback loop with a specified gain provides the FDM with 
the final estimate of size, which serves as learning signal for 
adapting object experience. In the present study, we can apply 
a similar model for size perception after an action execution. 
In our case, the objects were visual, not real objects and no 
haptic feedback was given after the execution of movement. 
So, the likelihood was represented by the matching of the 
fingers with the outer border of objects with/or the 
proprioceptive signals coming from the hand posture that are 
integrated with the prior.  
We found that the knowledge of action type was a factor 
modulating size perception. In fact, subjects perceived smaller 
the bars during the condition where they knew the subsequent 
action (PK) compared with the other condition where they did 
not know the subsequent action (NPK) for both reaching and 
grasping. A further demonstration of that was related to the 
possibility to predict with significant accuracy (>50%) the two 
conditions from perceptual responses before movement (see 
Fig. 3B-C). This approach is typical for neural responses and 
represents a novelty for this type of behavioral variables. The 
significance of these results is in line with evidence from 
behavioral research suggesting that motor planning processes 
increase the weight of visual inputs.  
Fig.3. A, Mean differences of perceptual responses between PK and NPK 
conditions in reaching and grasping. B, Confusion matrix of decoding results. 
C, Mean decoding accuracy for classification of NPK and PK conditions. 
Error bars are standard deviation. *P<0.05, significant level.  
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Hand visual feedback has been found to have a greater impact 
on movement accuracy when subjects prepare their 
movements with the prior knowledge that vision will be 
available during their reaches [16,17]. More interestingly, 
motor preparation facilitates the processings of visual 
information related to the target of movement. Similarly to 
Gutteling et al. [5] for object orientation, Wykowska et al. [18] 
reported that the detection of target size was facilitated during 
the planning of grasping but not during the planning of 
pointing. All these studies show the capacity of the brain to 
modulate the weight of visual inputs and provide an 
illustration of the importance of the context in visual 
information processing. In line with all these studies, our 
findings suggest that the knowledge or not of subsequent 
movement type defines a context that modulates the 
perceptual system. When subjects knew the subsequent 
movement, the perceptual system was within a definite context 
and perceived object smaller, scaling the measures according 
to hand motor abilities. In the other case, subjects were in an 
uncertain context about the successive action, and the 
perceptual system used different rules to scale the size reports. 
In both cases, the defined and undefined context can be 
predicted. All the mechanisms described in the present study 
could implement models of cognitive architecture of vision-
based reaching and grasping of objects located in the 
peripersonal space of a robot/agent. Additionally, the evidence 
that the perceptual system is dynamically modulated by 
contextual information about subsequent movement type can 
be used to improve cognitive architectures. For example one 
or multiple focus of attention signals can be sent to the object 
representation of robot/agent in order to amplify relevant 
features and at the same time inhibits distractors.   
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Abstract—We investigate a small footprint cognitive archi-
tecture comprised of two reactive planner instances. The first
interacts with the world via sensor and behaviour interfaces.
The second monitors the first, and dynamically adjusts its
plan in accordance with some predefined objective function.
We show that this configuration produces a Darwinian mind,
yet aware of its own operation and performance, and able to
maintain performance as the environment changes. We identify
this architecture as a second-order Darwinian mind, and discuss
the philosophical implications for the study of consciousness. We
use the Instinct Robot World agent based modelling environment,
which in turn uses the Instinct Planner for cognition.
BIOLOGICALLY INSPIRED COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURES
From the 1950’s through to the 1980’s the study of em-
bodied AI assumed a cognitive symbolic planning model for
robotic systems — SMPA (Sense Model Plan Act) — the most
well known example of this being the Shakey robot project
[1]. In this model the world is first sensed and a model of the
world is constructed within the AI. Based on this model and
the objectives of the AI, a plan is constructed to achieve the
goals of the robot. Only then does the robot act. Although this
idea seemed logical and initially attractive, it was found to be
quite inadequate for complex, real world environments.
In the 1990’s Rodney Brooks and others [2] introduced
the then radical idea that it was possible to have intelligence
without representation [3]. Brooks developed his subsumption
architecture as a pattern for the design of intelligent em-
bodied systems that have no internal representation of their
environment, and minimal internal state. These autonomous
agents could traverse difficult terrain on insect-like legs, appear
to interact socially with humans through shared attention
and gaze tracking, and in many ways appeared to possess
behaviours similar to that observed in animals. However,
the systems produced by Brooks and his colleagues could
only respond immediately to stimuli from the world. They
had no means of focusing attention on a specific goal or
of executing complex sequences of actions to achieve more
complex behaviours. Biologically inspired approaches are still
favoured by many academics, although a wide gap exists
between existing implementations and the capabilities of the
human mind [4]. Today, the argument persists concerning
whether symbolic, sub-symbolic or hybrid approaches are best
suited for the creation of powerful cognitive systems [5]. Here
we concern ourselves more specifically with action selection
as a core component of any useful cognitive architecture.
From Ethology to Robots
Following in-depth studies of animals such as gulls in their
natural environment, ideas of how animals perform action
selection were originally formulated by Nico Tinbergen and
other early ethologists [6], [7]. Reactions are based on pre-
determined drives and competences, but depend also on the
internal state of the organism [8]. Bryson [9] harnessed these
ideas to achieve a major step forwards with the POSH (Parallel
Ordered Slipstack Hierarchy) reactive planner and the BOD
(Behaviour Oriented Design) methodology, both of which are
strongly biologically inspired. A POSH plan consists of a
Drive Collection (DC) containing one or more Drives. Each
Drive (D) has a priority and a releaser. When the Drive
is released as a result of sensory input, a hierarchical plan
of Competences, Action Patterns and Actions follows. POSH
plans are authored, or designed, by humans alongside the
design of senses and behaviour modules. An iterative approach
is defined within BOD for the design of intelligent artefacts —
these are known as agents, or if they are physically embodied,
robots.
Kinds of Minds
Daniel Dennett[10] elegantly outlines a high level ontology
for the kind of minds that exist in the natural world. At the
most basic level, the Darwinian mind produces ‘hardwired’
behaviours, or phenotypes, based on the genetic coding of
the organism. The Skinnerian mind is plastic, and capable
of ’ABC’ learning — Associationism, Behaviourism, Connec-
tionism. The Popperian mind runs simulations to predict the
effect of planned actions, anticipating experience. It therefore
permits hypotheses “to die in our head” rather than requiring
them to be executed in the world before learning can take
place. Finally the Gregorian mind (after the psychologist
Richard Gregory) is able to import tools from the cultural
environment, for example language and writing. Using these
tools enables the Gregorian mind, for example the human
mind, to be self-reflective.
However, perhaps the simple Darwinian mind might also
be arranged to monitor itself, and in some small and limited
sense to be aware of its own performance and act to correct
it. Bryson suggests that consciousness might assist in action
selection [11], and here we investigate whether action selection
achieved through reactive planning might parallel one of the
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Fig. 1: Screen shot of the Instinct Robot World in operation. Each robot is represented as a single character within the display. Robots are labelled with
letters and numbers to distinguish them. When a robot’s monitor plan becomes active the robot representation changes to the shriek character (!). The top
right section of the screen is used to control the robots and the plans they use. The bottom right section displays statistics about the world as it runs.
commonly accepted characteristics of consciousness; that is to
be self-reflective and regulating [12].
Instinct and the Robot World
The Instinct Planner [13] is a biologically inspired reactive
planner specifically designed for low power processors and
embedded real-time AI environments. Written in C++, it
runs efficiently on both ARDUINO and MICROSOFT VC++
environments and has been deployed within the R5 low cost
maker robot to study AI Transparency [14].
It’s unique features are its tiny memory footprint and
efficient operation, meaning that it can operate on a low
powered micro-controller environment such as ARDUINO.
Alternatively, as in this experiment, many planners can run
within one application on a laptop PC.
The Instinct Robot World is a new agent based modelling
tool, shown in Figure 1. This is an open source project and all
code and configuration files are available online 1. Each virtual
‘robot’ within the Robot World uses an Instinct Planner to
provide action selection. Strictly, since these virtual robots are
not physically embodied, we should refer to them as agents.
However, we have chosen to use ‘robot’ throughout, as intu-
itively these cognitive entities appear to be virtually embodied
within the Robot World, and this choice of language seems
more natural. In the final section of this paper we discuss
1http://www.robwortham.com/instinct-planner/
future work where we may realise physical embodiment of
this architecture.
The Robot World allows many robots to be instantiated,
each with the same reactive plan, or with a variety of plans.
The robots each have senses to sense the ‘walls’ of the
environment, and other robots. The reactive plan invokes
simple behaviours to move the robot, adjust its speed and
direction, or interact with robots that it encounters within the
world as it moves. Most importantly for this investigation, each
robot also has a second Instinct Planner instance. This planner
monitors the first, and is able to modify its parameters based
on a predefined plan.
The Instinct Robot World provides statistical monitoring
to report on the overall activity of the robots within the
world. These include the average percentage of robots that are
moving at any one time, the average number of time units
(ticks) between robot interactions, and the average amount
of time that the monitor planner intervenes to modify the
robot plan. We use the Instinct Robot World to investigate the
idea of Reflective Reactive Planning — one reactive planner
driving behaviour based on sensory input and predefined drives
and competences, and another reactive planner monitoring
performance and intervening to modify the predefined plan of
the first, in accordance with some higher level objective. This
simple combination of two Darwinian minds, one monitoring
the other, might also be considered to be a second-order
Darwinian mind.
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Fig. 2: Architecture of the second-order Darwinian mind. The robot is controlled by the Instinct Reactive Planner, as it interacts with the Sensor model and
Behaviour Library. In turn, a second instance of Instinct monitors the first, together with the Internal robot state, and dynamically modifies parameters within
the robot’s planner.The overall effect is a robot that not only reacts to its environment according to a predefined set of goals, but is also to modify that
interaction according to some performance measure calculated within the Plan model.
CONJECTURES
We expect that second-order Darwinian minds will out-
perform first order minds when the environment changes,
because the monitor planner is concerned with achieving
higher order objectives, and modifies the operation of the first
planner to improve its performance. We also hypothesise that
this architecture will remain stable over extended periods of
time, because by restricting ourselves to the reactive planning
paradigm we have reduced the number of degrees of freedom
within which the architecture must operate, and previous
work shows that first-order minds produce reliable control
architectures [14]. Finally, we expect that such a second-order
system should be relatively simple to design, being modular,
well structured and conceptually straightforward.
METHODS
Figure 2 shows the Reflective Reactive Planning architecture
implemented within the Instinct Robot World, and controlling
the behaviour of each robot within that world. The robot plan
has the following simple objectives, each implemented as an
Instinct Drive.
• Move around in the environment so as to explore it.
• Avoid objects i.e. the walls marked as ‘X’ in Figure 1.
• Interact when another robot is ‘encountered’ i.e. when
another robot is sensed as having the same coordinates
within the grid of the Robot World. This interaction
causes the robot to stop for 200 clock cycles or ‘ticks’.
While the robot is in the ‘Interacting’ state it is shown as
a shriek character (!) within the Robot World display. Once
the robot has interacted its priority for interaction decreases,
but ramps up over time. This may be likened to most natural
drives, for example mating, feeding and the need for social
interaction.
The Monitor Plan is designed to keep the robot exploring
when it is overly diverted from social interactions. It achieves
this by monitoring the time between interactions. If, over three
interactions, the average time between interactions reduces
below 1000 ticks, then the Monitor Planner reduces the priority
of the interaction Drive. After 1000 ticks the priority is reset to
its original level. We might use alternative intentional language
here to say that the Monitor Planner ‘notices’ that the robot is
being diverted by too many social interactions. It then reduces
the priority of those interactions, so that the robot is diverted
less frequently. After some time the Monitor Planner ceases
to intervene until it next notices this situation re-occurring.
The Robot World is populated with varying numbers of
robots (2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000), and for each
number the experiment is run twice, once with a monitor plan,
and once without. For each run, the environment is allowed
to run for some time, typically about 10 minutes, until the
reported statistics have settled and are seen to be no longer
changing over time.
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OUTCOMES
The results are most elegantly and succinctly presented as
simple graphs. Firstly, the average number of robots moving at
any one time within the world is shown in Figure 3. In both
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Fig. 3: This graph shows the average percentage number of robots that are
moving at any one time within the world, for a given total number of robots
in the world. It can be seen that the addition of the monitor plan maintains
more robots moving as the number of robots increases. Note the log scale for
robots in world.
cases, as the number of robots within the world increases,
the amount of time that the robot spends moving reduces.
However the Monitor Planner acts to reduce the extent of
this reduction from 60% to less than 20% over the full range
of two to a thousand robots within the world. Similarly, in
Figure 4 we see that as more robots are introduced into the
world, the average time between interactions naturally reduces.
However, the action of the Monitor Planner progressively
limits this reduction, so that with 1000 robots the time between
interactions is almost trebled, from 310 to 885 ticks per
interaction. Interestingly, in both these graphs we see smooth
curves both with and without the action of the monitor plan.
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Fig. 4: This graph shows the average time between robot interactions, both
with and without the monitor plan. The addition of the monitor plan reduces
the variance in interaction time as robot numbers vary. Again, note the log
scale.
The final graph, Figure 5 also shows a smooth, sigmoid like
increase in activation of the Monitor Planner as the number
of robots increases, plotted on a logarithmic scale.
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Fig. 5: This graph shows the average percentage number of robots whose
monitor plan is activated at any one time, for a given number of total robots
in the world. Note the log scale.
The Instinct Robot World was found to be a stable, reliable
platform for our experiments, and the results it achieved were
repeatable. The application is single threaded, and so uses only
one core of the CPU on the laptop PC on which it was run.
Nevertheless, it was possible to simulate 1000 robots with both
reactive planners active operating in the world at the rate of
70 clock cycles (ticks) per second.
DISCUSSION
From the results we can see that by using a second Instinct
instance to monitor the first, we can achieve real-time learning
within a tiny-footprint yet nevertheless symbolic cognitive
architecture. In addition, since this learning modifies param-
eters from a human designed plan, the learning can be well
understood and is transparent in nature. This contrasts strongly
with machine learning approaches such as neural networks
that typically learn offline, are opaque, and require a much
larger memory workspace. Despite the stochastic nature of
the environment, the performance graphs show smooth curves
over a wide range of robot populations.
This relatively simple experiment also provides further fuel
for the fire concerning the philosophical discussion of the
nature of consciousness. Critics may say that when we use
the intentional stance [15] to describe the behaviour of the
Monitor Planner as ‘noticing’ something, we are merely using
metaphor. They might argue that there is in fact no sentience
doing any noticing, and in fact the only ‘noticing’ that is
happening here is us noticing the behaviour of this human
designed mechanism, which itself is operating quite without
any sentience and certainly without being conscious [16].
But that is to miss the point. We are not claiming that this
architecture is conscious in the human or even significant
sense of the word, merely that our architecture is inspired
by one aspect of how biological consciousness appears to
operate. However, having shown that this architecture can
indeed provide adaptive control, and drawing on the knowl-
edge that gene expression produces behaviours which can
be modelled using reactive planning, we might also consider
whether consciousness in animals and humans may indeed
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arise from complex hierarchical mechanisms. These mecha-
nisms are biologically pre-determined by genetics, and yet in
combination yield flexible, adaptive systems able to respond
to changing environments and optimise for objective functions
unrelated to the immediate competences of preprogrammed
behavioural responses. This is not to argue for some kind of
emergence [17], spooky or otherwise, but more simply to add
weight to the idea that the ‘I’ in consciousness is nothing more
than an internal introspective narrative, and such a narrative
may be generated by using hierarchical mechanisms that notice
one another’s internal states, decision processes and progress
towards pre-defined (phenotypic) objectives.
We could certainly envisage a much grander architecture,
assembled at the level of reactive planners, using maybe
hundreds or thousands of planners each concerned with certain
objectives. Many of these planners may be homeostatic in
nature, whilst others would be concerned with the achievement
of higher level objectives. We must remember that planners
merely coordinate action selection, and say nothing about how
sensor models may be formed, nor how complex behaviours
themselves may be implemented. However, all dynamic archi-
tectures need some kind of decision centric ‘glue’ to bind them
together, and reactive planning seems to be a useful candidate
here, as evidenced by practical experiment and biological
underpinning.
Machine transparency is a core element of our research. We
have shown elsewhere [14] that reactive planners, particularly
the Instinct Planner, are able to facilitate transparency. This is
due to the human design of their plans, and the ability to gather
meaningful symbolic information about internal system state
and decision processes in real-time as the planner operates.
This ability to inspect the operation of the architecture may
assist designers in achieving larger scale cognitive imple-
mentations. Equally importantly, transparency is an important
consideration for users and operators of intelligent systems,
particularly robots, and this is highlighted in the EPSRC
Principles of Robotics [18].
The human brain does not run by virtue of some elegant
algorithm. It is a hack, built by the unseeing forces of
evolution, without foresight or consideration for modularity,
transparency or any other good design practice. If we are
to build intelligent systems, the brain is not a good physical
model from which we should proceed. Rather, we should look
at the behaviours of intelligent organisms, model the way in
which these organisms react, and then scale up these models
to build useful, manageable intelligent systems.
Whilst our Reflective Reactive Planner is a very simple
architecture, it does share many of the characteristics cited for
architectures that are worthy of evaluation, such as efficiency
and scalability, reactivity and persistence, improvability, and
autonomy and extended operation [19]. We hope that our
work with reactive planners might strengthen the case for
their consideration in situations where decision centric ‘glue’
is required.
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
We have shown that a second-order Darwinian mind may
be constructed from two instances of the Instinct reactive
planner. This architecture, which we call Reflective Reactive
Planning, successfully controls the behaviour of a virtual robot
within a simulated world, according to pre-defined goals and
higher level objectives. We have shown how this architecture
may provide both practical cognitive implementations, and
inform philosophical discussion on the nature and purpose of
consciousness.
The Instinct Robot World is an entirely open source plat-
form, available online. We welcome those interested in agent
based modelling, cognitive architectures generally, and reac-
tive planning specifically, to investigate these technologies
and offer suggestions for new applications and further work.
One possibility might be to apply this architecture to the
Small Loop Problem [20], a specific challenge for biologically
inspired cognitive architectures.
We continue to develop robot applications for the Instinct
Planner, together with the Instinct Robot World. We are inves-
tigating the use of a small robot swarm to build a physically
embodied version of this experiment. To this end, we are
currently working with the University of Manchester’s Mona
robot2.
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Abstract—This paper develops, in sections I-III, the virtual
machine architecture approach to explaining certain features of
consciousness first proposed in [1] and elaborated in [2], in which
particular qualitative aspects of experiences (qualia) are proposed
to be particular kinds of properties of components of virtual
machine states of a cognitive architecture. Specifically, they are
those properties of components of virtual machine states of an
agent that make that agent prone to believe the kinds of things
that are typically believed to be true of qualia (e.g., that they are
ineffable, immediate, intrinsic, and private). Section IV aims to
make it intelligible how the requirements identified in sections II
and III could be realised in a grounded, sensorimotor, cognitive
robotic architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Those who resist the idea of a computational, functional,
or architectural explanation of consciousness will most likely
concede that many aspects surrounding consciousness are so
explicable (the so-called “easy problems” of consciousness
[3]), but maintain that there are core aspects of conscious-
ness having to do with phenomenality, subjectivity, etc. for
which it is Hard to see how a computational explanation
could proceed. A typical way of characterising this “Hard
core” of consciousness employs the concept of qualia: “the
introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental
lives” [4]. Surely there can be no computational explanation
of qualia?
This paper develops the virtual machine architecture ap-
proach to explaining certain features of consciousness first pro-
posed in [1] and elaborated in [2], in which qualia, understood
as particular qualitative aspects of experiences, are proposed
to be particular kinds of properties of components of virtual
machine states of a cognitive architecture. Specifically, they
are those properties of components of virtual machine states
of agent A that make A prone to believe:
1) That A is in a state S, the aspects of which are knowable
by A directly, without further evidence (immediacy);
2) That A’s knowledge of these aspects is of a kind such
that only A could have such knowledge of those aspects
(privacy);
3) That these states have these aspects intrinsically, not by
virtue of, e.g., their functional role (intrinsicness);
4) That these aspects of S cannot be completely commu-
nicated to an agent that is not A (ineffability).
Our emphasis on beliefs concerning these four properties
(immediacy, privacy, intrinsicness and ineffability), follows
the analysis in [5] in taking these properties to be central
to the concept of quale or qualia. But whereas [5] under-
stands this centrality to imply that the properties themselves
are conditions for falling under the concept, we understand
their centrality only in their role of causally determining the
reference of the concept. Roughly, qualia are not whatever has
those four properties; rather, qualia are whatever is (or was)
the cause of our qualia talk. And if we do know anything
about the cause of our qualia talk, it is this: it makes us prone
to believe that we are in states that have those four properties.
A crucial component of our explanation, which we call the
Virtual Machine Functionalism (VMF) account of qualia, is
that the propositions 1-4 need not be true in order for qualia
to make A prone to believe those propositions. In fact, it is
arguable that nothing could possibly render all of 1-4 true
simultaneously [5]. But on our view, this would not imply
that there are no qualia, since for qualia to exist it is only
required that that agents that have them be prone to believe
1-4, which can be the case even when some or all of 1-4 are
false.
It is an open empirical question whether, in some or all
humans, the properties underlying the dispositions to believe
1-4 have a unified, systematic structure that would make them
a single cause, and that would thereby make reference to
them a useful move in providing a causal explanation of
such beliefs. Is “qualia” more like “gold”, for which there
was a well-defined substance that was the source of mistaken,
alchemical talk and beliefs about gold? Or is “qualia” more
like “phlogiston”, in that there is no element that can be iden-
tified as the cause of the alchemists’ mistaken talk and beliefs
that they expressed using the world “phlogiston”? These are
empirical questions; thus, according to the VMF account of
qualia, it is an open empirical question whether qualia exist
in any particular human. By the same token, however, it is
an open engineering question whether, independently of the
human case, it is possible or feasible to design an artificial
system that a) is also prone to believe 1-4 and b) is so
disposed because of a unified, single cause. Thus, it is an
open engineering question whether an artificial system can be
constructed to have qualia. This paper goes some way toward
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getting clear on how one would determine the answer to that
engineering question.
Section II notes the general requirements that must be
in place for a system to believe 1-4, and then sketches
very briefly, in section III, an abstract design in which the
propensities to believe 1-4 can be traced to a unified virtual
machine structure, underwriting talk of such a system having
qualia.
II. GENERAL ARCHITECTURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
HAVING QUALIA
General requirements for meeting constraints 1-4 include
being a system that can be said to have beliefs and propensities
to believe, as well as what those properties themselves require.
Further, having the propensities to believe 1-4 in particu-
lar requires the possibility of having beliefs about oneself,
one’s knowledge, about possibility/impossibility, and other
minds. At a minimum, such constraints require a cognitive
architecture with reactive, deliberative and meta-management
components [1], with at least two layers of meta-cognition:
(i) detection and use of various states of internal virtual
machine components; and (ii) holding beliefs/theories about
those components.
III. A QUALIA-SUPPORTING DESIGN
A little more can be said about the requirements that 1-4
might impose on a cognitive architecture.
1) A propensity to believe in immediacy (1) can be ex-
plained in part as the result of the meta-management
layer of a deliberating/justifying but resource-bounded
architecture needing a basis for terminating delibera-
tion/justification in a way that doesn’t itself prompt
further deliberation or justification.
2) A propensity to believe in privacy (2) can be explained in
part as the result of a propensity to believe in immediacy
(1), along with a policy of normally conceiving of the
beliefs of others as making evidential and justificatory
impact on one’s own beliefs. To permit the termination
of deliberation and justification, some means must be
found to discount, at some point, the relevance of
others’ beliefs, and privacy provides prima facie rational
grounds for doing this.
3) A propensity to believe in intrinsicness (3) can also be
explained in part as the result of a propensity to believe
in immediacy, since states having the relevant aspects
non-intrinsically (i.e., by virtue of relational or systemic
facts) would be difficult to rectify with the belief that
one’s knowledge of these aspects does not require any
(further) evidence.
4) An account of a propensity to believe in ineffability
(4) requires some nuance, since unlike 1-3, 4 is in
a sense true, given the causally indexical nature of
some virtual machine states and their properties, as
explained in [2]. However, properly appreciating the
truth of 4 requires philosophical sophistication, and so
its truth alone cannot explain the conceptually primitive
propensity to believe it; some alternative explanations
must be offered, but it is not possible to do so here.
IV. COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE,
NOT COGNITIVIST ARCHITECTURE?
Given the anti-cognitivist, anti-representational, anti-
symbolic, embodied, enactivist, etc. inclinations of many in the
EUCognition community, the foregoing may be hard to accept
given its free use of representational and computational notions
such as belief, deliberation, justification, etc. The rest of this
paper, then, is an attempt at an in-principle sketch of how
one can have a grounded, dynamic, embodied, enactive(ish)
cognitive architecture that nevertheless supports the notions
of belief, inference, meta-belief, etc. that this paper has just
maintained are necessary for the subjective, qualia aspect of
consciousness, if not all aspects of consciousness.
This motivation is not strictly (that is, philosophically)
required, for two reasons:
• First, our self-appointed philosophical opponents do not
claim that the “easy problems” of consciousness can-
not be solved physicalistically, or even computationally.
Thus, in giving our explanation of the “Hard core” of
consciousness, qualia, we can help ourselves to any of
the capacities that are considered to fall under the “easy
problems”, which is the case for all of the requirements
we identified in sections II and III.
• Second, an aspect a of a cognitive architecture A can be
of the same kind as an aspect b of a distinct cognitive
architecture B, even if B is capable of the sorts of
beliefs mentioned in 1-4 because of possessing b, and
A, despite having a, is not capable of having those sorts
of beliefs. On our account, A might still have qualia by
virtue of having a; this is why our account does not,
despite appearances, over-intellectualize qualia, and is
instead consistent with, e.g., the empirical possibility that
animals and infants have qualia.
However, showing how architectures that do have the kinds
of beliefs mentioned in 1-4 can be constructed out of grounded
sensorimotor components is required if we are to achieve any
understanding of what a system that is incapable of having
those beliefs would have to be like for it to nevertheless
warrant ascription of qualia.
This section (that is, the rest of this paper) will not
have much to say about consciousness or qualia per se.
Furthermore, the sketched architectures are likely not optimal,
feasible, or even original. That there is some better way to
solve the task that we use for illustrative purposes below is
not to the point. The architectures and task are intended merely
to act as a proof-of-concept, as a bridge between the kind of
robotic systems that many in the EUCognition community are
familiar or comfortable with, and the kind of robotic cognitive
architecture that we have argued is required for qualia.
A. Robotic architecture, environment and task
Consider a robot that is static except that it can move its
single camera to fixate on points in a 2D field. The result
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R of fixating on point (x, y) is that the sensors take on a
particular value s out of a range of possible values S. That is,
R(x, y) = s ∈ S.
The visual environment is populated by simple coloured
polygons, at most one (but perhaps none) at each fixation point
(x, y). This visual environment is static during trials, although
it may change from trial to trial.
The robot has learned a map M that is a discrete partition of
S into a set of categories or features F (e.g., a self-organising
feature map): M(s) = fi ∈ F . In general, M is always applied
to the current sensory input s, thus activating one of the feature
nodes or vectors. For example, f1 might be active in those
situations in which the robot is fixating on a green circle, f2
might be active in those situations in which the robot is fixating
on a red triangle, etc.
Suppose also that the robot has the ability to detect the
occurrence of a particular auditory tone. After the tone is
heard, a varying visual cue (for example, a green circle)
appears in some designated area of the field (the upper left
corner say). The robot’s task (for which it will be rewarded)
is to perform some designated action (e.g. say “yes”) if and
only if there is something in the current visual environment
(other than in the designated cue area) whose feature map
classification matches that of the cue, that is: say “yes” iff
∃(x, y) : M(R(x, y)) = M(cue).
There are, of course, many strategies the robot could use
to perform this task. For illustrative reasons, we will consider
three.
B. Strategy One: Exhaustive search of action space
The first strategy is an exhaustive search of action space.
The robot performs a serial exhaustive search of the ac-
tion space R(x, y), stopping to say “yes” if at any point
M(R(x, y)) = M(cue). This requires motor activity, and is
likely to take a relatively long time to perform, although it
requires no “offline” preparation time. It is a “knowledge-free”
solution.
C. Strategy Two: Exhaustive search of virtual action space
The second strategy is to perform an exhaustive search of
a virtual action space.
1) Strategy Two, Version 1: Prior to hearing the tone, the
robot learns a forward model Ew from points of fixation
(x, y) to expected sensory input s at the fixated location:
Ew(x, y) = s ∈ S. After the tone and presentation of
the cue, the robot then performs a serial exhaustive search
of the expectation space Ew(x, y), stopping if at any point
M(Ew(i, j)) = M(cue). The robot then fixates on (i, j), and
if M(R(i, j)) = M(cue), then it says “yes”. Otherwise, the
search of the expectation space resumes. As this search is
for the most part virtual, only occasionally requiring action
(assuming E is reasonably accurate), this will be much faster
than the first strategy.
2) Strategy Two, Version 2: If the idea of an exhaustive se-
rial search of the expectation space is not considered neurally
plausible enough, a a second version of the second strategy
could employ a kind of content-addressable search (following
ideas first presented in [6]). The difference between cue and
E(x, y) (or between M(cue) and M(E(x, y)); see below) can
be used as a differentiable error signal, permitting gradient
descent reduction of error not in weight w space, but in visual
space (which is here the same as fixation space and action
space). That is (hereafter re-writing (x, y) as u), the robot can
apply the Delta rule, changing u proportionally to the partial
derivative of the error with respect to u:
∆u = µ
∂[ 12 (cue−E(u))2]
∂u .
Since the task question is primarily about matching one
of the cue categories fi and not the cue itself, this process
requires changing the robot’s virtual fixation point u according
to the above equation, and then checking to see if M(E(u)) =
M(cue)). If not, u is again updated according to the Delta rule.
Alternatively, one could measure the error directly in terms of
differences in feature map (M ) output; then the Delta rule
would prescribe:
∆u = µ
∂[ 12 (M(cue)−M(E(u)))2]
∂u .
In either case, this process should eventually arrive at a
value u′ that is a minimum in error space, although the number
of iterations of changes to u required to do so will depend on
a number of factors, including µ, which itself is constrained
by the “spikiness” of the error space with respect to fixation
points. This could result in many changes to u, but as such
changes are virtual, rather than actual changes in robot fixation
point, they can be performed much faster than real-time.
Standard problems with local minima apply: the fixed point
in u/error space where the derivative is zero may not only
not be a point for which actual error is zero (that is, where
M(R(u′)) = M(cue)); it may not even be a point for which
expected error is zero (that is, where M(E(u′)) = M(cue)).
Nonetheless, u′ can serve as a plausible candidate solution,
which can be checked by having the robot fixate on u′ via
R(u′). If a match (M(R(u′)) = M(cue)) is not achieved,
standard neural network methods for handling local minima
can be applied, if desired, to see if a better result can be
obtained.
This second version of the second strategy may in some
cases be more efficient than the first variation, in that it is
non-exhaustive. But both verisons of the second strategy buy
online performance at the price of prior “offline” exploration
of the action space, and the computational costs of learning
and memory.
As an aside, we note that the second version of strategy two
can be used in conjunction with strategy one (or even the first
verison of strategy two), in that it can suggest a heuristically-
derived first guess for a real-world (or virtual) search of points
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in the vicinity of that guess. In the case of failure, it wouldn’t
be useful as it stands, it seems; since E is deterministic,
when asked for a second guess after the failure of the first,
strategy two would give the same recommendation again.
However, it should be noted that the gradient descent method
is dependent on an initial guess u, and derives candidate
solutions as modifications to u. Therefore, it will give different
u′ answers if a different initial u is selected to seed the
gradient descent process, with the new u′ corresponding to
the local error minimum that is closest to the new u seed
chosen. Thus, search of the entire virtual (or actual) fixation
point (u) space can be reduced, in theory, to a virtual search of
the much smaller space of error basins in u-space. To prevent
wasteful duplication of effort, there would have to be some
way for the network to consider only previously-unconsidered
seeds; perhaps inhibition of previously-considered seeds could
achieve this.
D. Strategy Three: Learning a mapping from mappings to cues
A third strategy builds on the second strategy by employing
a form of reflection or meta-cognition to guide search more
efficiently. As with the second strategy, an expectational,
forward model Ew is used. Note that for any given kind of cue
(node or reference vector in the range of the feature map M ),
we can define the set Pcue to be all those parameter (weight)
sets w for E that yield a forward model that contains at least
one expectation to see that cue. That is, Pcue = ∀w : ∃(x, y) :
M(Ew(x, y)) = cue.
With a network distinct from the one realising E, the robot
can learn an approximation of Pcue. That is, the robot can
learn a mapping Fcue from weight sets for E to {1,0}, such
that Fcue(w) = 1 iff w ∈ Pcue. Generalising, the robot can
learn a mapping F from cues and weight sets for E to {1,0},
such that F (cue, w) = 1 iff w ∈ Pcue. That is, F is a
network that, given a vector w and a cue, outputs a 1 only
if w parameterises a forward model Ew for which there is at
least one fixation point (x, y) such that Ew “expects” cue as
input after performing R(x, y).
Given this, a third strategy for performing the task is to
simply input the current E parameter configuration w and
the cue into F , and say “yes” iff F (w, cue) = 1 (or, if one
prefers, make the probability of saying “yes” proportional to
F (w, cue)).
Like strategy two, strategy three spends considerable “of-
fline”, pre-task resources for substantial reductions in the time
expected to complete the online task. However, unlike both
strategy one and strategy two, this third strategy answers the
task question directly: it determines whether the existential
condition of the task question holds without first finding a
particular fixation point that satisfies the property that the task
condition (existentially) quantifies over. A drawback of this
is that the robot cannot, unlike with strategy two, check its
answer in the real world (except by essentially performing
strategy one). But as it is essentially a lookup computation, it
is very fast: no search, even virtual, is required. Admittedly,
this is only useful if F can be learned, and if the space
is not too spiky (nearby values for w should, in general,
imply nearby values for M(E(u))). Nevertheless, the the third
strategy would be useful for situations in which immediate,
gist-based action is required.
E. Metamappings as metacognition
As explained at the beginning of this section, we have
taken these efforts to incrementally motivate the architecture
in strategy three in order to illustrate how a grounded, sensori-
motor based system can merit ascription of the kinds of
metacognitive abilities that we have proposed are necessary
for crediting a system with qualia:
• In effect, the forward model E confers on the the system
belief-like states, in the form of expectations of what
sensor values will result from performing a given action.
These (object, not meta) belief-like states are total in that
a given state vector w yields an Ew that manifests a range
of such expectational beliefs, each concerning a different
action or point of fixation.
• Similarly, the forward model F confers on the the system
meta-belief-like states, in that they indicate which total,
object belief states have a particular content property.
(Note that the meta beliefs are not of the form, for some
particular w, u and cue: w manifests the belief that (or
represents that) M(R(u)) = M(cue). Rather, they are of
the form, for some particular w and cue: ∃u : w manifests
the belief that M(R(u)) = M(cue).)
Meta-belief is not only an explicit requirement for the kind
of qualia-supporting architecture outlined in section II and III;
it also opens to door to the further requirements of inference,
deliberation and sensitivity to logical relations. To see how,
consider one more addition to the architecture we arrived at
when discussing strategy three. As with the individual nodes
in the feature map, we can define the set Pc1,c2 to be all those
parameter sets w that yield a forward model that contains at
least one expectation to see c1 and one expectation to see c2;
that is, Pc1,c2 = ∀w : ∃(u1)(u2) such that:
• M(Ew(u1)) = c1; and
• M(Ew(u2)) = c2
With another network G distinct from E (and F ), the robot
can learn an approximation of Pc1,c2 : G(w, c1, c2) = 1 iff
w ∈ Pc1,c2 . That is, G is a network that:
• takes the parameters w of E as input
• outputs a 1 only if those parameters realise a forward
model Ew for which:
– ∃u1 : M(Ew(u1)) = c1; and
– ∃u2 : M(Ew(u2)) = c2;
Note that it is a logical truth that w ∈ Pc1,c2 → w ∈ Pc1 .
It follows that there is a logical relation between G and
F ; specifically, it should be true that G(w, c1, c2) = 1 →
F (w, c1) = 1. Assuming F and G are themselves reasonably
accurate, the robot could observe and learn this regularity.
But because F and G are only approximations, there might
actually be cases (values of w) where they are inconsistent
(where G(w, c1, c2) = 1 but F (w, c1) = 0). That such a
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mismatch constitutes error could be built into the architecture,
yielding an error signal not between expected and empirical
object-level states of affairs, but between a logical norm and
the empirical relation between meta-belief states that should
respect that norm.
How should the robot respond to this error signal, which
indicates the violation of a logical norm? In the case of
empirical, object-level error, the direction of fit is from model
to world, so error should be reduced by changing the model
(pace Friston and active inference[7]). But in this case, the
error is not between model and world, but between two models
of the world: should the robot modify F , or G, or both?
Although it seems unlikely that there is a general, situation-
independent answer to this question, one could certainly
imagine another iteration of reflection and complexity that
would enable a robot to learn an effective way for handling
such situations. For example, F and G could be part of a
network of experts, in which a gating network learns the kinds
of situations in which any F /G mismatch should be resolved in
F ′s favour, and which in G′s. But there is also the possibility
of a resolution due to implicit architectural features that do
not constitute a semantic ascent. An interactive activation
competition between F and G might, for example, always
be resolved in F ′s favour simply because F has fewer inputs
and parameters than G – or vice versa. Such a system could
be understood as having a belief, albeit an implicit one, that
object-level beliefs manifested in F are always more reliable,
justified, etc. than beliefs manifested in G. And again, a
sophisticated architecture, although continuous with the kinds
of systems considered so far, could observe instances of this
regularity, and thus learn the regularity itself. It could thus
come to know (or at least believe) that it always takes F -based
judgements to be more reliable than (logically conflicting) G-
based ones. From the error signal that is produced whenever
they disagree the system could come to believe that G and
F are logically related. The crucial point is that the robot
has the essentials of a notion of logical justification and
logical consistency of its own beliefs. It could use a systematic
mismatch between G and F as evidence that G requires more
learning, or indeed use that mismatch as a further error signal
to guide learning in G, or even E itself.
One could ask: why go to all this trouble? Couldn’t all of
this have been motivated simply by considering a robot that
contains two forward models, E and E′, that are meant to have
the same functionality, but which might contingently evolve in
such a way that they disagree on some inputs? The answer is
yes, and no. Yes, an instance of being a logically-constrained
cognizer is that one eschews believing P and ¬P . But no: to
start with such an architecturally unmotivated example would
not serve to make a general case for how meta-beliefs as a
whole could get going in a sensorimotor grounded architecture.
For one thing, it doesn’t suggest how sensitivity to logical
relations between sub-networks could assist in inference. But
with what has been presented concerning the conjunctive cue
network G, it is possible to understand, for example, how there
could be a disjunctive cue network H that maps weights w to
1 only if either one or the other of its associated cues c1 and
c2 is in the range of Ew. Such a network having output of 1
for w, in the face of F (w, c1) = 0, would allow the network
to infer that F (w, c2) should be 1, and use that in place of
computing F (w, c2) explicitly, or to generate an error signal
if F (w, c2) 6= 1, etc.
Further sophistication, conferring even more of the kinds
of metacognitive abilities discussed in sections II and III,
could be added by not just allowing the robot to observe
the holding or not of various logical relations in its own
beliefs, but by giving it the ability to take action on the meta-
level, and allow such actions to be guided, as on the object
level, by expectations realized in forward models on the meta-
level. Such forward models would not manifest expectations
about how sensory input would be transformed by performing
this or that movement, but rather how object-level forward
models such as E would change, if one were to perform
this or that operation on their parameter sets w. To give a
trivial example, there might be a primitive operation N that
could be performed on a forward model’s parameters that
had the effect of normalizing those parameters. A network’s
understanding of this might be manifested in a network J
such that J(w1, N) = norm(w1), J(w2, N) = norm(w2),
etc., with J being consulted when normalization is being
considered as a possible meta-action to perform.
V. CONCLUSION
The “Hard core” of consciousness is meant to be qualia, but
sections I-III argue that qualia, understood as the underlying
phenomenon (if any) that explains qualia-talk and qualia-
beliefs, might be explicable in terms of phenomena that are
considered to fall under the “easy problems” of consciousness.
The speculations of section IV fall short of closing the
loop started in sections II and III, but they hopefully give
one an idea how a grounded sensorimotor robotic cognitive
architecture could merit attribution of such features as having
beliefs and having beliefs about beliefs. In particular, it is
hoped that some substance has been given to the possibility
of such an architecture being able to employ concepts such as
justifcation, deliberation and consistency.
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Human-Aware Interaction:
A Memory-inspired Artificial Cognitive Architecture
Roel Pieters1, Mattia Racca1, Andrea Veronese1 and Ville Kyrki1
Abstract— In this work we aim to develop a human-aware
cognitive architecture to support human-robot interaction.
Human-aware means that the robot needs to understand
the complete state of the human (physical, intentional and
emotional) and interacts (actions and goals) in a human-
cognitive way. This is motivated by the fact that a human
interacting with a robot tends to anthropomorphize the robotic
partner. That is, humans project a (cognitive, emotional) mind
to their interactive partner, and expect a human-like response.
Therefore, we intend to include procedural and declarative
memory, a knowledge base and reasoning (on knowledge base
and actions) into the artificial cognitive architecture. Evaluation
of the architecture is planned with a Care-O-Bot 4.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the western world is aging, solutions have to be found
that ensure the current high-quality welfare state for the
future. This research aims to assess the suitability of robotics
for assistance and care. Such human-robot interaction should
foremost be safe, intuitive and user-friendly. This implies that
the robot must understand the person’s tasks, intentions and
actions, and must include a knowledge base for information
storage and reasoning.
II. PERCEPTION: INTENTION AND TASK MODELING
In order to provide assistance, the general state of the
human, as well as the task should be known. Human attention
can be used to understand a person’s intentions and the task
he/she is engaged in. By detecting the head pose of the
human and projecting this into a 3D point cloud of the en-
vironment, a weighted attention map can be generated (Fig.
1-left). Segmenting this map returns the object of interest and
can be used to determine which task the person is engaged in
[1]. Additionally, by actively gathering information (e.g., the
robot asking questions) a model of the task can be learned
(Fig. 1-right). This decision making problem under uncertain
conditions can be modeled as a partially observable Markov
decision process (POMDP). By solving the POMDP, the
robot can refine the task model, supervise the task execution
and provide assistance for the next phase [2].
Fig. 1: Left: Weighted attention map that returns three objects
of interest, the plate received most interest (red). Right: Task
modeling scenario. A person is making a sandwich while a
NAO robot observes and asks questions to build a task model
for assistance.
1All authors are with School of Electrical Engineering, Aalto Univer-
sity, Finland. Corresponding author: roel.pieters@aalto.fi
III. COGNITIVE MODELING: MEMORY AND REASONING
The knowledge base is divided in declarative memory
(semantic and episodic facts) and procedural memory (action
library). Semantic facts is general knowledge to represent
the beliefs, relations and intentions of the world, of hu-
mans and of objects. Episodic memory describes information
about events and instances that occurred, e.g., what, where
and when an event happened. The action library contains
primitives and sequences of tasks available to the robot. For
example, the task model is encoded as declarative knowl-
edge and describes the intention and relation between states
(phases) in a task. Moreover, it can also be described by an
action sequence and event sequence (episodic knowledge).
Reasoning over the knowledge base allows for fact checking,
relation assessment and event comparison, and can be used
for future predictions (internal simulation). Reasoning over
the action library allows to reuse, adapt and augment actions
and action sequences for different tasks.
IV. SYMBOLIC TASK PLANNING AND EXECUTION
The main function of the symbolic task planner is to
generate a suitable plan by checking if the task was ex-
perienced in the past (episodic memory in the knowledge
base) and how (procedural memory in the action library).
Missing information for a generated plan is obtained from
perception and reasoning over the knowledge base and the
action library. For example, actions take arguments that apply
to internal variables and functions (e.g., object pose, speech
recognition). High level execution ensures that the planned
task is executed appropriately and the instructed goal is
achieved (Fig. 2).
V. ROSE AND CARE-O-BOT 4
The proposed developments are part of the interdisci-
plinary research project ROSE (Robots and the Future of
Welfare Services2) which aims to study the social and psy-
chological aspect of service robotics. In particular, one aim of
Fig. 2: Artificial cognitive architecture for human-aware
interaction.
2http://roseproject.aalto.fi/en/
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this project is to investigate the requirements for social HRI
with elderly people and how these should be integrated in
practice. This applies for both the technological requirements
(i.e., what capabilities and algorithms are necessary) as well
as the social requirements (i.e., what does the user want).
The Care-O-Bot 4 will be used for human-robot interaction
studies and evaluation of the proposed artificial cognitive
architecture.
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The Role of the Sensorimotor Loop for Cognition
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Abstract—Locomotion is most of the time considered to be the
result of top-down control commands produced by the nervous
system in response to inputs received via sensory organs from the
environment. Locomotion may arise alternatively when attracting
states are stabilized in the combined dynamical space made up by
the brain, the body and the environment. Cognition is embodied
in this case within the sensorimotor loop, viz self-organized. Using
a physics simulation environment we show that self-organized
locomotion may result in complex phase spaces which include
limit cycle corresponding to regular movements and both strong
and partially predictable chaos describing explorative behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
We used the LPZRobots physics simulation environment [1]
to investigate the occurrence of self-organized embodiment in
robots for which sensation is confined to propio-sensation. The
‘brain’ of the robot, consisting of a single controlling neuron
per actuator, receives sensory information only regarding the
actual position x(a)i of the actuators i = 1, 2, 3, which are in
turn translated via
x
(t)
i = R [2y(xi)− 1] , (1)
to a target position x(t)i for the i-th actuator (compare Fig. 1).
R denotes here the (rescaled) radius of the spherical robot and
y(xi) = 1/(1 + exp(−xi)) the firing rate of the controlling
neuron. The membrane potential xi is determined via
x˙i = −Γxi + w0
2R
(
x
(a)
i + R
)
− z0
∑
j 6=i
ujϕjy(xj) (2)
by the relaxation constant Γ, by the coupling w0 > 0 to
the proprio-sensory reading of x(a)i , and with (−z0) < 0 by
the inhibition it receives from the other two neurons. The
interneural inhibition is dynamically modulated presynapti-
cally by a mechanism known as short-term synaptic plasticity
(STSP) [2], which we model as [3]:
u˙ = U(y)−uTu U(y) = 1 + (Umax − 1)y
ϕ˙ = Φ(u,y)−ϕTϕ Φ(u, y) = 1−
uy
Umax
.
Both the effective Ca2+ concentration u and the fraction of
available vesicles ϕ of neurotransmitters relax to unity in the
absence of a presynaptic input y, which, when present, tends
to increase/decrease u→ Umax and ϕ→ 0 respectively.
We note that STSP is well known to change synaptic
efficiencies transiently by up-to fifty percent on time scales of
a few hundred milliseconds, as defined by Tu and Tϕ. These
are also the time scales which are relevant for locomotion.
STSP does not induce any long-lasting traces (modifications
of the synaptic strength), being hence a fully transient form
of plasticity which tends to destablize fixpoint attractors.
II. AUTONOMOUS MODE SWITCHING
The here considered robot moves only, as an entity com-
prised of body and controlling neurons, when embedded
within the environment. Locomotion corresponds then to self-
stabilizing attractors in the combined phase space of the con-
trolling neural network, of the body and of the environmental
degrees of freedom it couples to [4].
Our robot may engage in a rich palette of regular motion
patterns, as illustrated in Fig. 2, which are stable either for
distinct sets of internal parameters, such as the bare synaptic
weights w0 and z0, or simultaneously. Autonomous mode
switching corresponding to a rollover from one to another
basin of attraction occurs regularly in the latter case upon colli-
sion with either an external object, or with another robot. We
note, importantly, that limit-cycles corresponding to regular
motion, as shown in Fig. 2, are continuously degenerate with
respect to the direction and/or to the center of propagation.
III. EXPLORATIVE CHAOS
Explorative behavior arises when the synaptic weights w0
and z0 are set such that chaotic attractors are formed within the
Fig. 1. The simulated robot contains three weights (red, green and blue)
moving along perpendicular rods within a movable sphere. The position of
the three weights is controlled respectively by a single neuron (see Eqs. (1)
and (2)). The small balls at the end of the respective rods are guides to the
eye. [video]
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Fig. 2. Six color-coded copies of the sphere robot starting each with slightly
different synaptic weights w0 and z0. The pink, cyan and yellow robots
perform various types of circular and star-like motions, with the red, blue
and green robots staring to move with finite translational velocities. For
the parameters of the blue and of the green robot two limit cycles coexist.
Both robots undergo collisions (the blue colliding with the red robot and the
green with the yellow robot), which induce transitions from one to the other
attracting state. A previous collision of the red with the pink robot resulted
(just) in a direction reversal. [video]
sensorimotor loop. We note that noise is absent for the simu-
lations shown in Fig. 3, with the seemingly random wandering
of the robot resulting exclusively from the chaotic nature of
the underlying attractor. Two types of chaotic attractors may
be stabilized in addition, denoted respectively as strong and
as partially predictable chaos [5].
IV. PLAYFUL LOCOMOTION
Morphological computation [6], [7], [8] may occur when
the body plays a central role in cognition. For a test of this
concept we have situated the sphere robot in a structured
environment, as shown in Fig. 4, containing movable blocks.
One observes that our three-neuron robot starts to engage in
Fig. 3. Two color-coded copies of the sphere robot exploring a maze. The
motions can be classified as strongly chaotic for the cyan robot and as partially
predictable chaos for the blue robot [5]. The blue robot switches to another
locomotion mode after colliding with the wall. The resulting radius of the
circular mode is, however, too large for the maze and it can follow it hence
only transiently. [video]
Fig. 4. Within a structured environment the robot starts to push blocks around
in a seemingly ’playful’ manner. [video]
a seemingly ‘playful’ manner with its environment, pushing
blocks around by bumping into individual objects repeatedly.
This occurs, from a dynamical systems point of view, when the
robot switches upon collisions back and forth between stable
chaotic motion and another weakly unstable, or alternatively
as in Fig. 3, stable coexisting limit-cycle attractor describing
regular locomotion.
V. CONCLUSION
The sphere robot does neither perform any form of knowl-
edge acquisition with its brain consisting of only three neu-
rons, nor does its ‘cognitive system’ dispose of higher-level
internal drives or motivations. The explorative behavior ob-
served in Figs. 3 and 4 can be explained on the contrary fully
in terms of dynamical systems theory. Taking a philosophical
perspective our simulated robots hence demonstrate that it is in
general impossible for an external observer to deduce reliably
the internal settings and motivations of an acting cognitive
system.
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Abstract—In this short paper, we argue that there are two
conflicting agendas at play in the design of cognitive architectures.
One is principled: to create a model of cognition and gain an
understanding of cognitive processes. The other is practical: to
build useful systems that have a cognitive ability and thereby
provide robust adaptive behaviour that can anticipate events
and the need for action. The first is concerned with advancing
science, the second is concerned with effective engineering. The
main point we wish to make is that these two agendas are not
necessarily complementary in the sense that success with one
agenda may not necessarily lead, in the short term at least, to
useful insights that lead to success with the other agenda.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two aspects to the goal of building a cognitive
robot [1]. One is to gain a better understanding of cognition
in general — the so-called synthetic methodology — and the
other is to build systems that have capabilities that are rarely
found in technical artifacts (i.e. artificial systems) but are
commonly found in humans and some animals. The motivation
for the first is a principled one, the motivation for the second
is a practical one. Which of these two aspects you choose to
focus on has far-reaching effects on the approach you will
end up taking in designing a cognitive architecture. One is
about advancing science and the other is more about effective
engineering. These two views are obviously different but they
are not necessarily complementary. There is no guarantee that
success in designing a practical cognitive architecture for an
application-oriented cognitive robot will shed any light on the
more general issues of cognitive science and it is not evident
that efforts to date to design general cognitive architectures
have been tremendously successful for practical applications.
The origins of cognitive architectures reflects the former
principled synthetic methodology. In fact, the term cognitive
architecture can be traced to pioneering research in cognitivist
cognitive science by Allen Newell and his colleagues in their
work on unified theories of cognition [2]. As such, a cognitive
architecture represents any attempt to create a theory that
addresses a broad range of cognitive issues, such as attention,
memory, problem solving, decision making, and learning,
covering these issues from several aspects including psychol-
ogy, neuroscience, and computer science, among others. A
cognitive architecture is, therefore, from this perspective at
least, an over-arching theory (or model) of human cognition.
†Much of the work described in this paper was conducted while the author
was at the University of Sko¨vde, Sweden. This research was funded by the
European Commission under grant agreement No: 688441, RockEU2.
It continues today under the banner of artificial general in-
telligence, emphasizing human-level intelligence. The term
cognitive architecture is employed in a slightly different way in
the emergent paradigm of cognitive science where it is used
to denote the framework that facilitates the development of
a cognitive agent from a primitive state to a fully cognitive
state. It is a way of dealing with the intrinsic complexity
of a cognitive system by providing a structure within which
to embed the mechanisms for perception, action, adaptation,
anticipation, and motivation that enable development over the
systems life-time. Nevertheless, even this slightly different
usage reflects an endeavour to construct a viable model that
sheds light on the natural phenomenon of cognition.
From these perspectives - cognitivist and emergent - a
cognitive architecture is an abstract meta-theory of cognition
and, as such, focusses on generality and completeness (e.g.
see [3]). It reflects Krichmar’s first aspect of the goal of
building a cognitive robot: to gain a better understanding
of cognition in general [1]. We draw from many sources in
shaping these architectures. They are often encapsulated in
lists of desirable features (sometimes referred to as desiderata)
or design principles [4], [5], [6], [7]. A cognitive architecture
schema is not a cognitive architecture: it is a blueprint for the
design of a cognitive architecture, setting out the component
functionality and mechanisms for specifying behaviour. It
describes a cognitive architecture at a level of abstraction
that is independent of the specific application niche that the
architecture targets. It defines the necessary and sufficient
software components and their organization for a complete
cognitive system. The schema is then instantiated as a cog-
nitive architecture in a particular environmental niche. This,
then, is the first approach to designing a cognitive architecture
(or a cognitive architecture schema). We refer to it as design
by desiderata.
The second approach is more prosaic, focussing on the
practical necessities of the cognitive architecture and designing
on the basis of user requirements. We refer to this as design
by use case. Here, the goal is to create an architecture that
addresses the needs of an application without being concerned
whether or not it is a faithful model of cognition. In this
sense, it is effectively a conventional system architecture,
rather than a cognitive architecture per se, but one where
the system exhibits the required attributes and functionality,
typically the ability to autonomously perceive, to anticipate
the need for actions and the outcome of those actions, and
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Fig. 1. The iCub cognitive architecture (from [9]).
Fig. 2. Project DREAMs cognitive architecture (from [11]).
to act, learn, and adapt. In this case, the design principles,
or desiderata, do not drive the cognitive architecture — the
requirements do that — but it helps to be aware of them so
that you know what capabilities are potentially available and
might be deployed to good effect. Significantly, design by use
case implies that it is not feasible to proceed by developing
a cognitive architecture schema and then instantiating it as
a specific cognitive architecture because routing the design
through the meta-level schema tacitly abstracts away many of
the particularities of the application that makes this approach
useful.
We can recast the distinction between the two motivations
for building cognitive robots and designing cognitive archi-
tectures by asking the following question. Should a cognitive
architecture be a specific or a general framework? This is
an important design question because a specific instance of
a cognitive architecture derived from a general schema will
inherit relevant elements but it may also inherit elements that
are not strictly necessary for the specific application domain.
Also, it is possible that it is not sufficient, i.e. that it does
not have all the elements that are necessary for the specific
application domain.
To illustrate this argument, consider two architectures that
were designed in these two different manners: the iCub cog-
nitive architecture (Figure 1 ) [8], [9] which was designed by
desiderata [9], [7] for use in a general-purpose open cognitive
robot research platform, and the DREAM system architecture
with its cognitive controller (2 ) [10], [11] which was designed
by use case [12] for use in Robot-Enhanced Therapy targetted
at children with autism spectrum disorder. The former com-
prises components that reflect generic properties of a cognitive
system; the latter comprises several functional components
that directly target the needs of therapists who can control
the cognitive architecture through a GUI.
II. CONCLUSION
There are two ways not to design a cognitive architecture.
If your focus is on creating a practical cognitive architecture
for a specific application, you should probably not try to do
so by attempting to instantiate a design guided by desiderata;
you are probably better off proceeding in a conventional
manner by designing a system architecture that is driven
by user requirements, drawing on the available repertoire
of AI and cognitive systems algorithms and data-structures.
Conversely, if your focus is a unified theory of cognition —
cognitivist or emergent — then you should probably not try
to do so by developing use-cases and designing a matching
system architecture. You are likely to miss some of the key
considerations that make natural cognitive systems so flexible
and adaptable, and it is unlikely that you will shed much light
on the bigger questions of cognitive science.
REFERENCES
[1] J. L. Krichmar, “Design principles for biologically inspired cognitive
architectures,” Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures, vol. 1, pp.
73–81, 2012.
[2] A. Newell, Unified Theories of Cognition. Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press, 1990.
[3] J. E. Laird, C. Lebiere, and P. S. Rosenbloom, “A standard model of the
mind: Toward a common computational framework across artificial in-
telligence, cognitive science, neuroscience, and robotics.” AI Magazine,
vol. In Press, 2017.
[4] R. Sun, “Desiderata for cognitive architectures,” Philosophical Psychol-
ogy, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 341–373, 2004.
[5] J. L. Krichmar and G. M. Edelman, “Principles underlying the construc-
tion of brain-based devices,” in Proceedings of AISB ’06 - Adaptation in
Artificial and Biological Systems, ser. Symposium on Grand Challenge
5: Architecture of Brain and Mind, T. Kovacs and J. A. R. Marshall,
Eds., vol. 2. Bristol: University of Bristol, 2006, pp. 37–42.
[6] J. E. Laird, “Towards cognitive robotics,” in Proceedings of the SPIE
— Unmanned Systems Technology XI, G. R. Gerhart, D. W. Gage, and
C. M. Shoemaker, Eds., vol. 7332, 2009, pp. 73 320Z–73 320Z–11.
[7] D. Vernon, C. von Hofsten, and L. Fadiga, “Desiderata for develop-
mental cognitive architectures,” Biologically Inspired Cognitive Archi-
tectures, vol. 18, pp. 116–127, 2016.
[8] D. Vernon, G. Sandini, and G. Metta, “The iCub cognitive architec-
ture: Interactive development in a humanoid robot,” in Proceedings of
IEEE International Conference on Development and Learning (ICDL),
Imperial College, London, 2007.
[9] D. Vernon, C. von Hofsten, and L. Fadiga, A Roadmap for Cognitive
Development in Humanoid Robots, ser. Cognitive Systems Monographs
(COSMOS). Berlin: Springer, 2010, vol. 11.
[10] D. Vernon, E. Billing, P. Hemeren, S. Thill, and T. Ziemke, “An
architecture-oriented approach to system integration in collaborative
robotics research projects - an experience report,” Journal of Software
Engineering for Robotics, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 15–32, 2015.
[11] P. Gomez Esteban, H. Cao, A. De Beir, G. Van De Perre, D. Lefeber, and
B. Vanderborght, “A multilayer reactive system for robots interacting
with children with autism,” in Proceedings of the Fifth International
Symposium on New Frontiers in Human-Robot Interaction, 2016.
[12] D. David, “Intervention definition,” vol. DREAM Deliverable D1.1,
2014.
Proceedings of EUCognition 2016 - "Cognitive Robot Architectures" - CEUR-WS Vol. 1855 43
A System Layout for Cognitive Service Robots
Stefan Schiffer1,2
1 Knowledge-Based
Systems Group (KBSG)
RWTH Aachen University
Alexander Ferrein2
2 Mobile Autonomous Systems and
Cognitive Robotics Institute (MASCOR)
FH Aachen University of Applied Sciences
Abstract—In this paper we discuss a system layout for cognitive
service robots. The goal is to sketch components and their inter-
play needed for cognitive robotics as introduced by Ray Reiter.
We are particularly interested in applications in domestic service
robotics where we focus on integrating qualitative reasoning and
human-robot interaction. The overall objective is to build and
maintain a knowledge-based system and agent specification.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we are concerned with a system layout for
what is often called cognitive robotics. Cognitive robotics as
introduced by the late Ray Reiter is to be understood as “the
study of the knowledge representation and reasoning problems
faced by an autonomous robot (or agent) in a dynamic and
incompletely known world” [5]. Our application domain is
domestic service robotics [15]. It deals with socially assistive
robots that perform helpful tasks for humans in and around
the house. These robots must be able to engage in communi-
cation with the humans around them. What is more, when a
robot needs to assist humans with complex and cognitively
challenging tasks, it must be endowed with some form of
reasoning that allows to take decisions on the course of action
in complex scenarios. In addition, autonomous operation for
extended periods of time is only possible if the robot can
handle certain variations and unavoidable errors by itself. Also,
it should be flexible in dealing with human fallibility. We refer
to such a robot as a cognitive service robot system.
II. A COGNITIVE SERVICE ROBOT SYSTEM LAYOUT
We now discuss a system layout for such a cognitive service
robot in domestic applications. Figure 1 shows an overview
of the elements that we think are necessary and useful for
a cognitive robotic system. The particular focus here is on
integrating qualitative reasoning and human-robot interaction
[7], [8] for applications in domestic domains [11].
The blue elements are components that provide basic ca-
pabilities like collision avoidance and localization. The green
boxes represent high-level components, that is, components
featuring a sophisticated reasoning mechanism. We use a
logic-based high-level language called ReadyLog [4] which,
among other things, features decision-theoretic planning in
the spirit of [2]. The orange components bridge between
the high-level and the human or extend the high-level with
mechanisms to facilitate intuitive interaction. The yellow box
finally, is an optional but desirable component to enable
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Fig. 1: A cognitive service robot system layout
enduring autonomy. It is an extension of the high-level control
that has tight connections to the basic components.
A. Basic Human-Robot Interaction Modules
Our domestic service robot is supposed to interact with
laymen. Hence, it needs to be operable by such laymen and
the interaction between the human and the robot needs to be
as natural and intuitive as possible. This is why we argue for
extending the basic capabilities with modules for three im-
portant human-robot interaction components, namely speech,
face, and gesture recognition. Examplary solutions for such
components tailored for the particular application scenarios
can be found in [3], [1], and [9] respectively. We consider
these components since they represent (perhaps the most)
important modalities in human-robot interaction. Human-robot
interaction can be made even more natural and affective with
additional components such as text-to-speech and an animated
visual appearance.
B. High-level Reasoning
A domestic service robot that needs to assist humans with
complex and cognitively challenging tasks, must be endowed
with some form of reasoning that allows it to take decisions
in such complex scenarios. This high-level reasoning abstracts
from the details of lower levels and provides mechanisms
to come up with a dedicated course of action for a robot
to reach a particular goal. Our robot features a logic-based
high-level reasoning component for that purpose. It allows for
flexibly combining programming and planning in the behavior
specification of the robot.
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C. Qualitative Representations and Control
One of the issues in developing a robotic system that
interacts with humans is the difference in representations
with humans and machines. A technical system mostly uses
numbers to represent things like speed, distance, and ori-
entation while humans use imprecise linguistic notions. A
robotic system that assists humans in their daily life, must
be equipped with means to understand and to communicate
with humans in terms and with notions that are natural to
humans. The qualitative representations and reasoning with
them should be available especially for positional information
(e.g. as proposed in [12]) since these are very frequent in
domestic settings, for example, with references to objects and
places.
D. Semantic Annotations
Another building block to mediate between the raw sensor
data and the numerical information that the base components
of a cognitive robot work with are semantic annotations. In our
cognitive robot system, for instance, we allow for generating
semantically annotated maps [10]. This attaches semantic
information to places like functions of a room or where it
is likely to find people in an apartment. Another example
could be part of the object recognition [6], where objects are
described by a set of (semantic) attributes. This way, one can
dynamically build classes of objects, for example, all objects
with a specific color.
E. Natural Language Interpretation
Humans tend to be imprecise and imperfect in their natural
spoken language. Therefore, when natural language is used to
give instructions to a robot, the robot is potentially confronted
with incomplete, ambiguous, or even incorrect commands.
Aiming for a robust and flexible system a method for natural
language interpretation that can account for handling such
fallibility is beneficial. We present such a system [13] that
uses decision-theoretic planning in the spirit of DT-Golog [2]
to interpret the instruction given to the robot. It is able to
account for imprecise and missing information and initiates
steps for clarification accordingly.
F. Self-Maintenance
A robotic system that is capable of planning and executing
complex tasks is a complex system itself. That is why such
a system is itself vulnerable to errors. These errors are not
restricted to action execution but span to internal system errors
as well. As an additional component in the system layout
we proposed a system for self-maintenance [14] that is able
to detect and circumvent certain errors. Thus we increase
the system’s robustness and enable longer-term autonomous
operation.
III. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed the layout of a cognitive ser-
vice robotic system that integrates qualitative reasoning and
human-robot interaction for applications in domestic service
robotics. The system layout features components that allow
for implementing a capable service robotic system. The layout
addresses bridging the gap between the robot and the human
with several measures, making available the qualitative notions
that humans commonly use in the robot system, in general,
and in the high-level reasoning, in particular. This allows
for natural interaction and with its advanced reasoning the
robot can assist its human users with complex and cognitively
challenging tasks. This is especially useful with disabled or
elderly people.
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The Mirror Self-recognition for Robots 
iCubSim at the mirror 
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Abstract—We introduce a simple example of artificial system 
which aims to mimic the process of the mirror self-recognition - 
ability limited to very few species. We assume that evolution of 
the species is reflected in the structure of the underlying control 
mechanism and design modules of the mechanism, concerning its 
incremental development. On this example, we also demonstrate 
modular architecture suitable for such task. It is based on 
decentralization and massive parallelism and enables incremental 
building of control system which is running in real-time and 
easily combines modules operating at different pace. 
Keywords—the mirror self-recognition; robot iCubSim; Agent-
space architecture 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Seeing in the mirror, we recognize ourselves. However 
child less than eighteen months old is rather looking for 
another person behind the mirror. In nature, the mirror self-
recognition is present only in exceptional cases, for instance 
chimpanzees recognize themselves in the mirror, while cats do 
not. Can a robot recognize itself in the mirror? And what is the 
origin of the self-recognition ability? We follow Scassellati and 
Hart [3], who suppose that a robot should recognize itself in the 
mirror due to perfect correlation between body movement and 
the image seen in the mirror. Unlike them and like Takeno [8] 
we use a very simplified body model.  
II. TESTBED
Using the simulator of the humanoid robot iCub [7] we 
added a camera shooting the area in the front of the monitor 
with the robot rendered image, we create a control system on 
which we can examine how the mirror self-recognition 
emerges from basic mechanisms. This enables us to establish 
interaction between the virtual robot and human sitting at the 
monitor and later between the robot and its image reflected to 
the camera by the mirror. The simulator has almost perfect 
model of the robot body. However for our purposes we intend 
to simplify it, thus we move a single joint – the joint moving 
head from side to side. In this way the body model is simplified 
to a single number – the angle of the robot head inclination. 
III. ARCHITECTURE
For examination of mechanisms underlying the mirror self-
recognition process, we employ a modular framework (Agent-
Space Architecture [5]) which enables us to let the control 
system emerge from the parallel course of simpler modules and 
from their mutual interactions. Agent-Space Architecture is a 
software tool for building modular control systems of robots, 
running in real-time. It is strongly based on ideas of Brooks' 
subsumption architecture [1] and Minsky's society model of 
mind [6] [4]. Within the framework we define operation of 
individual modules and connect various module outputs to 
various module inputs (many:many) regardless the fact that 
each module can operate at different pace. Such combining of 
either really slow or really fast processes is possible due to all 
data produced by a module (producer) being written onto a 
blackboard (called space) and processed later, when another 
module (consumer) is ready to process them. These written 
data remain on the blackboard until they are rewritten by the 
same or another producer, or their time validity expires. Finally 
the data exchange supports also hierarchical control and its 
incremental development, e.g. module has to define sufficient 
priority for written data – otherwise it would not be able to 
rewrite their previous value already written on the blackboard. 
IV. MECHANISMS
Now we can try to implement the system, using which we 
are able to evaluate correlation between own body movement 
and the seen image movement. We aim to implement a 
working demo following biological relevancy of our approach, 
based on knowledge about the above-mentioned species. 
A. Body model (proprioception) 
The body model is provided by the iCubSim simulator, thus 
we need to implement just its control and monitoring from the 
blackboard. We implement a module motor which reads an 
intended joint position intention from the blackboard, 
communicates with the simulator (via yarp rpc protocol) and as 
a result, it writes proprioception to the blackboard which 
represents a real joint position (Fig. 1). In parallel, the added 
camera regularly provides a new image to the blackboard.  
B. Mirroring 
As we aim to compare the body model (i.e. value 
proprioception) with the image captured by the camera, we 
need to get an analogical model from the image. This approach 
is still biologically relevant since several species are proven to 
obtain such ability (mirror neurons). (How such ability has 
emerged and evolved, is not the subject of our exploration – it 
is only limited to the implementation of this ability.) Since we 
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take into account both interaction between the robot and human 
and interaction between the robot and its image in the mirror, 
we combine two specific methods which output the same data 
onto the backboard – the model of the seen image (the model 
value in Fig. 1).  
Fig. 1. The modular structure of the mirror self-recognition system 
Fig. 2. The iCumSim robot following its own image in the mirror 
For the iCubSim image processing (we rotate a printed 
picture of iCubSim in front of the camera) we employ the 
SURF method. SURF provides projection of given template to 
the image seen from which we can easily calculate inclination 
of the template. For the processing of human image (interacting 
person is moving his head in front of the camera) we use 
combination of Haar face detector and CamShift tracking: the 
Haar detector detects face in the upright position and sets up 
template for CamShift to track. The projection of the template 
to the seen image calculated by CamShift provides us with the 
required head inclination. All algorithms employed are 
available in OpenCV library (www.opencv.org). 
C. Imitation 
The correlation of these two comparable models can only be 
evaluated by their changes through time therefore both robot 
and human have to be put in motion. One of the mechanisms, 
that can provide it, is imitation. Due to the utilized mirroring, 
a passive imitation can be implemented by direct copying of 
values of the body model seen (i.e. the model value) into the 
robot’s body model (i.e. the intention value). As a result, 
iCubSim imitates side to side movement of one’s head when 
moving in front of the camera. Optionally we can also 
implement the active part of imitation, which can be called the 
invitation to imitation and obtains a higher priority than the 
passive imitation and occasionally generates side to side 
movement of the robot’s head when the body seen does not 
move. However we found out that even slight inaccuracies in 
the model evaluation are sufficient to induce the imitation 
process. 
D. Social modelling 
Imitation process provides us with the data of correlation 
between the body owned and the body seen. When an 
individual lives within a society, it is important for him to 
categorize the data and associate them with the image seen. 
When such individual meets the mirror, it possibly creates a 
new category and finds out that the corresponding correlation 
is unusually high. In fact, it is so high that the image seen can 
not only be associated with the body model seen, but also with 
its own body, meaning that it sees itself. Instead of modelling 
the society, for our purposes, it is sufficient to record the data 
produced by the two models since the aim of the study is to 
differentiate the data created when robot encounters human 
and when robot sees its own image in the mirror.  
V. CONCLUSION 
As a result of implementation of the above mentioned 
mechanisms, when iCubSim's image is reflected into the 
external camera by a mirror, robot invites himself to imitation 
and it stays in an interaction with itself for certain amount of 
time (Fig. 2). Thus correlation between the body model 
(proprioception) and the model of the image seen (model) can 
be evaluated and its unusually high value indicates that the 
robot sees itself in the mirror. Thus the designed structure of 
the mirror self-recognition process is partially verified. 
As a teaser video can be viewed here: 
http://www.agentspace.org/mirror/iCubSimAtTheMirror.mp4 
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Towards Incorporating Appraisal into Emotion Recognition: A Dynamic
Architecture for Intensity Estimation from Physiological Signals
Robert Jenke1, Angelika Peer2
Abstract—Current approaches to emotion recognition do not
address the fact that emotions are dynamic processes. This work
concerns itself with the development of a gray-box framework
for dynamic emotion intensity estimation that can incorporate
findings from appraisal models, specifically Scherer’s Compo-
nent Process Model. It is based on Dynamic Field Theory
which allows the combination of theoretical knowledge with
data-driven experimental approaches. Further, we conducted
an exemplary user study applying the proposed model to esti-
mate intensity of negative emotions from physiological signals.
Results show significant improvements of the proposed model
to common methodology and baselines. The flexible cognitive
architecture opens a wide field of experiments and directions
to deepen the understanding of emotion processes as a whole.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current efforts in Human-Robot-Interaction (HRI) aim
at finding ways to make interaction more natural. In this,
knowledge of the user’s emotional state is considered an
important factor. Methods of automatic estimation of affec-
tive states from various modalities, including physiological
signals, have therefore received much attention lately.
Recent work in emotion theory, e.g. Scherer’s Compo-
nent Process Model (CPM), points out the dynamic nature
of emotion processes which therefore, “require a dynamic
computational architecture” [1]. To date, however, most work
on emotion recognition concerns itself with static prediction
of emotion labels from a window of time series data using
machine learning methods (i.e. black-box approach).
Our main research objective is to design a gray-box model
for emotion recognition from physiological signals, which
is capable of combining theoretical knowledge incorporated
in the CPM with experimental data to train parameters the
model. In this paper, we address the hitherto neglected
dynamic evolvement of the affective state by proposing an
architecture for emotion intensity estimation based on the
Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) [2].
II. MODEL
In the CPM, the subjective feeling (i.e. affective state) is
characterized by the emotion intensity I of an emotion quality
ϑ at time t and can generally be written as I(ϑ, t). The CPM
provides detailed relations between the so-called stimulus
evaluation checks (SECs) that happen in the appraisal process
and their effects on physiology. For example, a novelty
check can lead to an increase in skin conductance or the
obstructiveness of an event changes the heart rate of a person.
1Chair of Automatic Control Engineering, Technische Universita¨t
Mu¨nchen, Munich, Germany, www.lsr.ei.tum.de, E-mail: rj@tum.de
2Bristol Robotics Laboratory, University of the West of England, Bristol,
UK, www.brl.ac.uk, E-mail: angelika.peer@brl.ac.uk
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Fig. 1. The subjective feeling component is divided into consecutive
estimation of emotion quality ϑˆ(t) and emotion intensity Iˆ(ϑ, t).
Similar to Bailenson et al. [3], we separate estimation
of emotion quality and intensity (see Fig. 1). We control
the former by experimental design, i.e. we assume ϑˆ(t) to
be a known input to our model. The architecture of our
dynamic model is based on DFT. These fields usually span
over physical dimensions such as space or angle and model
dynamic changes along this dimension. Fields are governed
by differential equations and can represent functionalities like
memory (for details, see [4]).
For our model, we define the field over the emotion quality
ϑ as shown in Fig. 2. The core part of the model is the
intensity layer i(ϑ, t) together with a memory layer m(ϑ, t),
which model the changes in the subjective feeling, i.e. the
output Iˆ(ϑˆ, t). The second part are the input layers, where
we use one layer for each prediction from the SECs provided
by the CPM, e.g. u(ϑ, t) in Fig. 2. For example, a change
in skin response would be an input layer.
u(ϑ, t)
i(ϑ, t)
m(ϑ, t)
ϑ
Iˆ(ϑˆ, t)
ϑˆ
Input Activity Output
0
0
0
1
1
1
Fig. 2. Architecture of the proposed dynamic model: three-layer field
spanned over the dimension of emotion quality ϑ.
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We control the emotion quality ϑˆ in our experimental
design by fixing it through choice of emotion induction. This
results in a simplified dynamic model at one location of the
fields, i.e. three neurons and their governing equations.
For the dataset, we recorded the galvanic skin response
(GSR) of subjects. Additionally, we used a slider device
interface to record the emotion intensity experienced by the
subject. For emotion induction, we used standardized IAPS
pictures of a fixed emotion quality, here, negative emotions
[5]. After segmentation, we had collected 7 trials of 110 s
recordings for each of three subjects.
The change in GSR is computed as a prediction of SECs
and used as model input. The continuously recorded intensity
measures of the slider served as ground truth. For training of
the dynamic model, free parameters are determined by means
of experimental data applying leave-one-out cross validation.
In this, we minimize the error between the output of the
dynamic model and the ground truth s.t. boundary conditions.
IV. RESULTS
First, we compare the accuracy of our model with common
static methods and baselines, i.e. linear regression and ran-
dom regressors. We use the match of estimate with ground
truth plus an acceptable error margin as accuracy measure.
In summary, the dynamic model performs significantly better
than common methodology and baselines. Limitations of the
model become apparent for small error margins.
Secondly, capabilities and limitations of the model in its
current version are examplified in Fig. 3. In the upper graph,
we see the changes in GSR, which characterize the onset
as well as the increase of intensity well. The memory layer
(bottom graph) helps to stabilize the decay at an appropriate
rate. However, limitations of the current model are apparent,
as the third change in GSR should not have any impact on the
intensity. This points towards the need to include additional
input layers where appropriate interaction can avoid this
behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
For the first time, a dynamic gray-box model framework
based on DFT has been proposed for emotion recognition,
which allows to include theoretical knowledge into the model
and learn free parameters from experimental results. We
designed and carried out an exemplary study to estimate
emotion intensity from physiological signals. In this, the
dynamic model performed significantly better than baselines.
We also identified current limitations and ways to improve
the model. Future work includes several extension to the
architecture as well as carrying out experiments to further
evaluate the model.
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A Needs-Driven Cognitive Architecture for Future
‘Intelligent’ Communicative Agents
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Abstract—Recent years have seen considerable progress in
the deployment of ‘intelligent’ communicative agents such as
Apple’s Siri, Google Now, Microsoft’s Cortana and Amazon’s
Alexa. Such speech-enabled assistants are distinguished from the
previous generation of voice-based systems in that they claim
to offer access to services and information via conversational
interaction. In reality, interaction has limited depth and, after
initial enthusiasm, users revert to more traditional interface
technologies. This paper argues that the standard architecture
for a contemporary communicative agent fails to capture the
fundamental properties of human spoken language. So an al-
ternative needs-driven cognitive architecture is proposed which
models speech-based interaction as an emergent property of
coupled hierarchical feedback control processes. The implications
for future spoken language systems are discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
The performance of spoken language systems has improved
significantly in recent years, with corporate giants such as
MicroSoft and IBM issuing claim and counter-claim as to
who has the lowest word error rates. Such progress has con-
tributed to the deployment of ever more sophisticated voice-
based applications, from the earliest military ‘Command and
Control Systems’ to the latest consumer ‘Voice-Enabled Per-
sonal Assistants’ (such as Siri) [1]. Research is now focussed
on voice-based interaction with ‘Embodied Conversational
Agents (ECAs)’ and ‘Autonomous Social Agents’ based on
the assumption that spoken language will provide a ‘natural’
conversational interface between human beings and future (so-
called) intelligent systems – see Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. The evolution of spoken language technology applications.
In reality, users’ experiences with contemporary spoken
language systems leaves a lot to be desired. After initial
enthusiasm, users lose interest in talking to Siri or Alexa,
and they revert to more traditional interface technologies [2].
One possible explanation for this state of affairs is that, while
component technologies such as automatic speech recognition
and text-to-speech synthesis are subject to continuous ongoing
improvement, the overall architecture of a spoken language
system has been standardised for some time [3] – see Fig. 2.
Standardisation is helpful because it promotes interoperability
and expands markets. However, it can also stifle innovation
by prescribing sub-optimal solutions. So, what (if anything)
might be wrong with the architecture illustrated in Fig. 2?
Fig. 2. Illustration of the W3C Speech Interface Framework [3].
In the context of spoken language, the main issue with the
architecture illustrated in Fig. 2 is that it reflects a traditional
stimulus–response (‘behaviourist’) view of interaction; the
user utters a request, the system replies. This is the ‘tennis
match’ analogy for language; a stance that is now regarded
as restrictive and old-fashioned. Contemporary perspectives
regard spoken language interaction as being more like a three-
legged race than a tennis match [4]: continuous coordinated
behaviour between coupled dynamical systems.
II. TOWARDS A ‘COGNITIVE’ ARCHITECTURE
What seems to be required is an architecture that re-
places the traditional ‘open-loop’ stimulus-response arrange-
ment with a ‘closed-loop’ dynamical framework; a frame-
work in which needs/intentions lead to actions, actions lead
to consequences, and perceived consequences are compared
to intentions/needs (in a continuous cycle of synchronous
Proceedings of EUCognition 2016 - "Cognitive Robot Architectures" - CEUR-WS Vol. 1855 50
Fig. 3. Illustration of the proposed architecture for a needs-driven communicative agent [7].
behaviours). Such an architecture has been proposed by the
author [5], [6], [7] – see Fig. 3.
One of the key concepts embedded in the architecture
illustrated in Fig. 3 is the agent’s ability to ‘infer’ (using
search) the consequences of their actions when they cannot be
observed directly. Another is the use of a forward model of
‘self’ to model ‘other’. Both of these features align well with
the contemporary view of language as “ostensive inferential
recursive mind-reading” [8]. Also, the architecture makes
an analogy between the depth of each search process and
‘motivation/effort’. This is because it has been known for
some time that speakers continuously trade effort against
intelligibility [9], [10], and this maps very nicely into a
hierarchical control-feedback process [11] which is capable of
maintaining sufficient contrast at the highest pragmatic level of
communication by means of suitable regulatory compensations
at the lower semantic, syntactic, lexical, phonemic, phonetic
and acoustic levels.
As a practical example, these ideas have been used to con-
struct a new type of speech synthesiser (known as ‘C2H’) that
adjusts its output as a function of its inferred communicative
success [13], [14] – it listens to itself!
III. FINAL REMARKS
Whilst the proposed cognitive architecture successfully cap-
tures some of the key elements of language-based interaction,
it is important to note that such interaction between human
beings is founded on substantial shared priors. This means
that there may be a fundamental limit to the language-based
interaction that can take place between mismatched partners
such as a human being and an autonomous social agent [15].
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Artificial Spatial Cognition for Robotics and Mobile 
Systems: Brief Survey and Current Open Challenges 
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Abstract—Remarkable and impressive advancements in the 
areas of perception, mapping and navigation of artificial mobile 
systems have been witnessed in the last decades. However, it is 
clear that important limitations remain regarding the spatial 
cognition capabilities of existing available implementations and 
the current practical functionality of high level cognitive models 
[1, 2]. For enhanced robustness and flexibility in different kinds 
of real world scenarios, a deeper understanding of the 
environment, the system, and their interactions -in general terms- 
is desired. This long abstract aims at outlining connections 
between recent contributions in the above mentioned areas and 
research in cognitive architectures and biological systems. We try 
to summarize, integrate and update previous reviews, 
highlighting the main open issues and aspects not yet unified or 
integrated in a common architectural framework. 
Keywords—spatial cognition; surveys; perception; navigation 
I.  BRIEF SURVEY 
A. Initial models for spatial knowledge representation and 
main missing elements 
Focusing on the spatial knowledge representation and 
management, the first contributions inspired by the human 
cognitive map combined metric local maps, as an Absolute 
Space Representation (ASR), and topological graphs [3]. As a 
related approach, the Spatial Semantic Hierarchy (SSH) [4] 
was the first fundamental cognitive model for large-scale 
space. It evolved into the Hybrid SSH [5], which also included 
knowledge about small-scale space. This fundamental work 
was undoubtedly groundbreaking, but it did not go beyond 
basic levels of information abstraction and conceptualization 
[6]. Moreover, the well-motivated dependencies among 
different types of knowledge (both declarative and procedural) 
were not further considered for general problem solving [7]. 
The SSH model was considered suitable for the popular 
schema of a “three layer architecture”, without explicitly 
dealing with processes such as attention or forgetting 
mechanisms. This lack of principled forgetting mechanisms has 
been identified by the Simultaneous Localization and Mapping 
(SLAM) robotics community as a key missing feature of most 
existing mapping approaches [8, 9]. 
B. The role of cognitive architectures and their relation to 
other works in the robotics community 
Cognitive architectures provide a solid approach for 
modeling general intelligent agents and their main 
commitments support the ambitious requirements of high level 
behavior in arbitrary situations for robotics [10]. A more recent 
model of spatial knowledge, the Spatial/Visual System (SVS) 
[11] designed as an extension of the Soar cognitive 
architecture, proposed a different multiplicity of 
representations, i.e. symbolic, quantitative spatial and visual 
depictive. The spatial scene is a hierarchy tree of entities and 
their constitutive parts, with intermediate nodes defining the 
transformation relations between parts and objects. Other 
works in robotics employ similar internal representation ideas 
[12-14], and other ones included the possibility to hypothesize 
geometric environment structure in order to build consistent 
maps [15]. While a complete implementation of this approach 
for all kind of objects requires solving the corresponding 
segmentation and recognition problems in a domain 
independent manner (which is far beyond the state of the art), 
keeping the perceptual level representations within the 
architecture enhances functionality. A very active research 
community address these difficult challenges.  
The recognition process should not only use visual, spatial 
and motion data from the Perceptual LTM but also conceptual 
context information [7, 16] and episodic memories of 
remembered places [17], from Symbolic LTM. This should 
also apply to the navigation techniques for different situations 
[18, 19]. The existence of motion models for the objects can 
improve navigation in dynamic environments, which is one of 
the main problems in real world robotic applications [20, 21]. 
A novel cognitive architecture specifically designed for 
spatial knowledge processing is the Casimir architecture [22], 
which presents rich modeling capabilities pursuing human-like 
behavior. Navigation, however, has not been addressed, and 
this work has scarcely been discussed in the robotics domain.  
One of the latest spatial models is the NavModel [23], 
designed and implemented for the ACT-R architecture. Besides 
considering multi-level representations, this model presents 
three navigation strategies with varying cognitive cost. The 
first developed implementation assumes known topological 
localization at room level, while a subsequent implementation 
incorporates a mental rotation model. This work focuses on the 
cognitive load and does not deal with lower level issues.  
To point out how topics are addressed by the respective 
communities, we compiled Table I as a comparison. The 
contrast regarding memory management and uncertainty seems 
This work was partially funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economics and 
Competitivity: DPI 2014-53525-C3-1-R, NAVEGASE. It also received funding 
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to be relevant. The lack of approaches combining both 
allocentric and egocentric representations is also remarkable. 
To conclude, Table II shows a summary of surveys. 
TABLE I.  COMPARISON OF TOPICS ADDRESSED BY THE COGNITIVE 
ARCHITECTURES AND ROBOTICS COMMUNITIES 
Cognitive Architectures 
Community 
← Topic →  Perception, Robotics, 
Vehicles Community
ACT-R/S, CLARION Egocentric spatial models [24, 25]
LIDA, SOAR-SVS Allocentric spatial models [9, 26]
Casimir, LIDA, SOAR-SVS Object based/ semantic representations [6, 12-14]
SOAR-SVS 
Explicit motion models / dynamic 
information about the environment 
[27, 28]
All 
Memory management, forgetting 
mechanisms 
[19]
Extended LIDA [29] Uncertainty considerations 
Most mapping and 
navigation approaches
TABLE II.  SUMMARY OF SURVEYS 
Topic References 
Robotics and Cognitive Mapping [1]
SLAM and Robust Perception [8, 9]
Computational cognitive models 
 of spatial memory  
[2]
Object recognition [30, 31]
Cognitive Architectures for Robotics [10]
Spatial knowledge in brains [17]
II. CURRENT OPEN CHALLENGES
The big challenge is closing the gap between high level 
models and actual implementations in artificial mobile systems. 
To reduce this existing gap, we identify three main goals:  
 Combination of allocentric and egocentric models
using different levels of features/objects +
topology/semantics.
 Acquisition and integration of motion models and
dynamic information for the elements/objects.
 Integration of global mapping & loop closure
capabilities with extensive declarative knowledge
about features relevance and forgetting
mechanisms with episodic memory.
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Abstract—For robots to become ubiquitous in every home,
it is imperative for them to be able to safely and intuitively
interact with objects that humans use on a daily basis. To
allow for such operation, we propose a cognitive model that will
allow robots to recognize and work with common appliances,
such as microwaves, refrigerators, dishwashers, and other similar
equipment, found in everyday scenarios.
I. MOTIVATION
Robots are rapidly becoming a part of our everyday life and
they will need to intelligently interact with complex, unknown
and changing environments. Automatic modeling of various
aspects of the environment based on visual perception is a fun-
damental challenge to be addressed. We humans are extremely
adept at manipulating equipment with very little experience
and are able to generalize to other similar equipments easily.
There has been prior work done on visual detection of
appliances [1], [2] which use visual sensors such as cameras or
barcode scanners to recognize features on the appliances and
then matching them to a pre-populated database to identify
the appliance and how it is to be operated. These approaches
lack generality, since every appliance will have its own unique
features and it is possible that such matches might not exist
in their proposed database.
II. GENERIC COGNITIVE MODEL
We propose a generic cognitive model for an appliance-
agnostic visual learning procedure that will allow the system
to identify, understand and ultimately operate an appliance,
such as a refrigerators or a microwave oven. The cognitive
model approach allows a system to describe an appliance at a
high level of abstraction, focusing on a hierarchical definition
of the appliance under observation, and provides a general
interface for describing all the possible interactions with the
appliance. This approach has the additional benefit of allowing
development of modular and generic software packages that
can be utilized by any robotic system for performing similar
tasks.
A. Cognitive Model Description
Our proposed cognitive model is organized as a hierarchy of
schemas, arranged in a top-down fashion based on the level
of abstraction and generalization of description. The main
idea behind our model is the common-sense observation that
every appliance has a box-like geometry. All other operational
aspects of this “box”, such as the handle or the door, are
positionally constrained to it in a very specific manner. This
top-level box has a certain fixed size as a property and has
“attributes” associated with it.
Every appliance, depicted as a box, has a set of “common”
attributes associated with it, by virtue of its design and
intended operation. These attributes include: 1) an opening
or a cavity, 2) a door, 3) a handle, and 4) a control panel.
Each of these attributes have a fixed world location, speci-
fied relative to the box and has other task-specific properties
associated with it. Correctly identifying these properties allow
the system to generate a cognitive model that can specify,
without explicitly requiring knowledge of the appliance itself,
the possible tasks that can be performed with the appliance.
Fig. 1. Cognitive model hierarchy.
The cognitive model is generated according to the hierarchy
specified in Fig. 1. From the figure, the topmost level of the
hierarchy is populated by the box-like structure of the Body
of the appliance itself. This level is characterized by the size
of the appliance and its location in the world.
Following this, the hierarchy branches out into the Interior,
also known as the internal cavity of the appliance. This interior
cavity is also a box-like structure, usually having similar
properties as the global box structure but having scaled-down
property values. This Interior cavity is characterized by its
relative location to the Body and has attributes of being
empty or occupied.
Another child of the Body, we have the Door, having a rel-
ative positional constraint to the Body. The Door is character-
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ized by the relative location of its sub-property, the Hinge. The
Door’s affordance, i.e. the property that allows the door to be
manipulated, is decided by the properties of the Hinge, which
has attributes of being located either at the Top|Bottom or
Left|Right relative to the Door. This positional attribute
dictates whether the Door will open horizontally or vertically
and also determines the rotational/translational range of the
Door.
The Door has another crucial sub-property, the Handle,
which along with the Hinge also determines the affordance.
The Handle is also relatively positioned to the Door and
has attributes that describe the ‘type’ of handle present,
namely a rectangular shape, a cylindrical shape or
an indented handle.
The Body has another child, the Control Panel, which
allows for operation of the appliance via its electronic control
system. This control panel is characterized by the input it
allows, such as via knobs, switches or buttons.
B. Using the Cognitive Model
Fig. 2. Possible state transitions for each of the appliance parts.
Once a cognitive model for an appliance is generated,
we can use the inherent properties of each sub-part of the
appliance to allow the robot to operate the appliance on a
task-by-task basis. Assuming a proper implementation of the
manipulation mechanism, it becomes possible for the robot
to start using the appliance based on the cognitive model.
This is facilitated by using the cognitive model as a state
machine, as illustrated in Fig. 2, where every sub-part of
the appliance body has a set of states associated with it,
depending on the situation. For instance, the Interior cavity of
a microwave can either be occupied or empty, which will
consequently dictate whether an object can be placed inside
the cavity or be removed from it. A Handle can be either
pulled or pushed and a Control Panel can be operated by
pressing|turning|toggling, depending on the task.
III. MODEL GROUNDING BY OBSERVATION
We implement a system that automatically grounds instances
of the abstract cognitive model described above, given visual
observations of humans operating the appliance under scrutiny.
The input to our system is a recording, via a robot-mounted
RGB-D camera, of a human demonstrating how to operate
an appliance once. After several stages of offline processing,
our system outputs a hierarchical structure that is a grounded
instance of our proposed appliance cognitive model. Specif-
ically, it both populates each individual part of the model
with a suitable 3D geometric primitive in its correct position
relative to the object reference frame and encodes affordances
of movable parts by providing hinge connection specifications
(e.g., a hinge for a door). Processing stages can be summarized
as follows:
1) Fusion of the depth maps into a single point cloud
while the entire observed scene remains rigid. Frames
involving independently moving areas are flagged as
dynamic and involve moving appliance parts. Every non-
dynamic interval will result in a 3D point cloud recon-
struction of a different (static) state of the appliance
under observation.
2) Fitting of geometric primitives for all reconstructed point
clouds. The first reconstruction corresponds to the initial
appliance state (with all doors closed) and is used to fit
the appliance exterior box. Subsequent reconstructions
will be registered to the same coordinate frame and used
to fit primitives to the (now visible) appliance cavities.
3) Dynamic segments are used to model moving parts and
their joint types. Each segment is expected to capture the
movement of a single appliance part. The part’s motion
is classified as either rotational (e.g., for a fridge door)
or translational (e.g., for a drawer) and the estimated
hinge parameters are stored in the appliance model.
Fig. 3. Grounded model visualization for a fridge and a microwave oven.
IV. RESULTS
In Fig. 3, we depict grounded instances of our cognitive model
for two appliances: a fridge and a microwave oven. The left
column shows models in ‘closed’ state, overlaid to the exterior
reconstructed point cloud. The right shows each appliance
model rendered as ‘open’ with interior boxes becoming visible,
showing detected affordances of the moving parts.
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Abstract—We propose a robotic cognitive control framework
that exploits supervisory attention and contention scheduling
for flexible and adaptive orchestration of structured tasks.
Specifically, in the proposed system, top-down and bottom-up
attentional processes are exploited to modulate the execution
of hierarchical robotic behaviors conciliating goal-oriented and
reactive behaviors. In this context, we propose a learning method
that allows us to suitably adapt task-based attentional regulations
during the execution of structured activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we present a robotic cognitive control frame-
work that permits flexible and adaptive orchestration of mul-
tiple structured tasks. Following a supervisory attentional
system approach [12], [7], we propose an executive system
that exploits top-down (task-based) and bottom-up (stimulus-
based) attentional mechanisms to conciliate reactive and goal-
oriented behaviors [4], [5]. In this paper, we describe adap-
tive mechanisms suitable for this framework. Specifically, we
propose a learning method that allows us to regulate the top-
down and bottom-up attentional influences according to the
environmental state and the tasks to be accomplished. In con-
trast with typical task-learning approaches [11], [6], our aim
here is to adapt and refine attentional parameters that affect
the competition among active tasks and reactive processes.
Learning methods for robotic supervisory attentional system
have been proposed to enhance action execution automaticity
and reduce the need of attentional control [8], instead here we
are interested in flexible orchestration of hierarchical tasks.
In the following sections, we present the architecture of the
executive system and briefly introduce the associated adaptive
mechanisms.
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The cognitive control framework presented in this paper is
based on a supervisory attentional system that regulates the
execution of hierarchical tasks and reactive behaviors. The
system architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1. The attentional
executive system is endowed with a long term memory (LTM)
that contains the behavioral repertoire available to the sys-
tem, including structured tasks and primitive actions; these
tasks/behaviors are to be allocated and instantiated in the
Working Memory (WM) for their actual execution. In particu-
lar, the cognitive control cycle is managed by the alive process
that continuously updates the WM by allocating and deallocat-
ing hierarchical tasks/behaviors according to their denotations
in the LTM. We assume a hierarchical organization for tasks
and activities [9], [12], [7] and this hierarchy is represented
in the WM as a tree data structure that collects all the tasks
currently executed or ready for the execution (see Fig. 2). More
specifically, each node of the tree stands for a behavior with
the edges representing parental relations among sub-behaviors.
In this context, abstract behaviors identify complex activities
to be hierarchically decomposed into different sub-activities,
instead concrete behaviors are for sensorimotor processes that
compete for the access to sensors and actuators. The allocated
concrete behaviors are collected into the attentional behavior-
based system illustrated in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. System Architecture. The LTM provides the definitions of the available
tasks, which can be allocated/deallocated in the WM by the alive behavior.
In this framework, each behavior is associated with an
activation value, which is regulated by an adaptive clock
[3], [2]. This clock represents a frequency-based attentional
mechanism: the higher is the frequency, the higher is the reso-
lution at which a process/behavior is monitored and controlled.
The clock period is bottom-up and top-down regulated by a
behavior-specific monitoring function f (σ ,ε)= λ according to
the behavioral stimuli σ and the overall state of the WM ε . In
particular, the bottom-up frequency 1/λ is directly affected by
behavior-specific stimuli (e.g. distance of a target), while the
top-down regulation is provided by a value µ that summarizes
the overall top-down influences of the WM. In this context,
bottom-up stimuli emphasize actions that are more accessi-
ble to the robot (e.g. object affordances), while top-down
influences are affected by the task structures and facilitate
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the activations of goal-oriented behaviors. In this framework,
multiple tasks can be executed at the same time and sev-
eral behaviors can compete in the WM generating conflicts,
impasses, and crosstalk interferences [10], [1]. Contentions
among alternative behaviors competing for mutually exclusive
state variables (representing resources, e.g. sensors, actuators,
etc.) are solved exploiting the attentional activations: following
a winner-takes-all approach, the behaviors associated with the
higher activations are selected with the exclusive access to
mutually exclusive resources.
III. ADAPTIVE REGULATIONS
In the proposed framework, action selection depends on
the combined effect of top-down and bottom-up attentional
regulations. In order to set these regulations, we associate each
edge of the WM with a weight w j,i that regulates the intensity
of the attentional influence from the behavior j to the sub-
behavior i (bottom-up for i = j, top-down otherwise). This
way, the overall activation value associated with each node is
obtained as the weighted sum ∑ jwi, jci, j of the contributions
from the top-down and bottom-up sources. These weights
are to be suitably adapted with respect to the tasks and the
environment. For this purpose, we propose to deploy a neural
network approach. Specifically, during the execution the WM
tree is associated with a multi-layered neural network, while
the weights associated with the nodes are refined exploiting
error backpropagation. In this setting, the system can be
trained by a user that takes the control of the robot to correct
the execution of a task. The training session is associated
with an adaptive process: the difference between the system
behavior and the human correction is interpreted as an error
to be backpropagated through the task hierarchy in order to
adapt the associated weights.
Fig. 2. WM configuration during the execution of a take-and-return task. The
contending behaviors (leafs of the hierarchy) receive inputs from the upper
nodes (black links) producing output values for the shared variables (dark
blue box). The user can correct the execution (joypad) to train the system.
As an exemplification, we consider the instance of the
WM illustrated in Fig. 2. In this case, a mobile robot has
to take a colored object (ob jRed) and return it to the home
position. Here, five concrete behaviors compete to acquire two
contended variables ( f orwardSpeed and turnSpeed) which
are used to control the robots movements. For instance, the
avoidObstacle behavior is affected by two top-down influ-
ences (reach(ob jRed) and goto(home) subtasks), while the
bottom-up influence is inversely proportional to the distance
of the closest obstacle. During the execution of the task, the
system selects the most emphasized behavior and produces a
vector of values ~v representing motor patterns for the shared
variables. The robot navigation is monitored by the human,
which is ready to change the robot trajectory using a joypad
when a correction is needed. The user interventions generate
a new set of values for the shared variables ~v∗ that dominate
and override the ones produced by the other behaviors. As
long as the user drives the robot, the difference between the
systems output ~v and the suggested values ~v∗ is exploited
to estimate the total error of the task execution. This error
is backpropagated from the concrete behaviors to the rest of
the hierarchy, in so adjusting the weights associated with the
behavior and sub-behaviors which are active in the WM.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We presented an adaptive mechanism suitable for a cog-
nitive control framework based on a supervisory attentional
system approach. The proposed method permits adaptive and
interactive adaptation of top-down and bottom-up attentional
regulations in order to execute structured hierarchical tasks.
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Abstract—The foundations of cognition and cognitive be-
haviour are consistently proposed to be built upon the capability
to predict (at various levels of abstraction). For autonomous
cognitive agents, this implicitly assumes a foundational role for
memory, as a mechanism by which prior experience can be
brought to bear in the service of present and future behaviour.
In this contribution, this idea is extended to propose that an
active process of memory provides the substrate for cognitive
processing, particularly when considering it as fundamentally
associative and from a developmental perspective. It is in this
context that the claim is made that in order to solve the question
of cognition, the role and function of memory must be fully
resolved.
I. PREDICTION, COGNITION, AND MEMORY
There are a range of competencies that are involved in cog-
nition: an ongoing challenge is to identify common functional
and organisational principles of operation. This will facilitate
both the understanding of natural cognition (particularly that
of humans), and the creation of synthetic artefacts that can
be of use to individuals and society. One such principle is
that of prediction [1], prospection [2], or indeed simulation
[3], as being fundamental to cognition. A further requirement
is the need to incorporate an account of development [4] as a
means of an individual to gain cognitive competencies through
experience (of the physical and social world), rather than a
priori programming.
It is suggested that one common dependency of these princi-
ples is a requirement for memory. At this point, the definition
of memory provided is only in the broadest sense: i.e. memory
is a process that acquires information through experience in
the service of current and future behaviour [5]. While broad,
it nevertheless commits to a fundamental function/role for
memory in behaviour [6]. It is on this basis that the remainder
of this contribution is focused: taking memory as fundamental,
how can it be characterised such that it serves cognition (and
the development thereof)?
In one particular perspective grounded in neuropsycholog-
ical data, emphasis is placed on the associative and network
nature of memory. This is apparent in the “Network Memory”
framework for example [7], which proposes a hierarchical
and heterarchical organisation of overlapping distributed as-
sociative networks that that formed through experience, and
whose reactivation gives rise to the dynamics that instantiate
cognition [8]. Such a perspective is not unusual, e.g. [1],
despite the apparent contradiction to multi-system accounts
of memory organisation, e.g. [9], [10], with it being also
consistent with more purely theoretical considerations, e.g.
[11], that emphasise the dynamical process properties of
memory over passive information storage.
By taking on this interpretation of memory, a more re-
fined process definition memory may be ventured: memory
is a distributed associative structure that is created through
experience (the formation associations), and which forms the
substrate for activation dynamics (through externally driven
activity, and internal reactivation) that gives rise to cognitive
processing [12], [5]. The creation of structure through expe-
rience is consistent with developmental accounts, and enforce
the consideration of not only interaction with the environment,
but also the social context of the learning agent (if human-
like cognition is to be considered). Previous explorations have
suggested how this framework can be used (in principle)
to account for human-level cognitive competencies within a
memory-centred cognitive architecture [13], although there
remain many gaps in this account that require addressing
before it can be considered definitive.
II. APPLICATION AND IMPLICATIONS
Following this definition, take for example the role that
such a memory-centred cognitive architecture could play in
facilitating social robot behaviour, as a prototypical example
of a cognitive competence that needs to be fulfilled. It is
uncontroversial to suggest that humans incrementally acquire
social skills (though perhaps based on some inherently present
mechanisms) over time and through development. The role
of memory within this is therefore also not controversial,
particularly when skills such as intent prediction (based on
prior experience) are also considered [14]. Using an associative
network that learns from the behaviour of the interaction
partner [15], following the use of simple associative learning
in [16], it has been found that a degree of behavioural
alignment between a child and a robot is observed within
real-time interactions - an effect readily seen in human-human
interactions. While only a basic illustration of human-like
competence, this nevertheless demonstrates the importance of
memory for social HRI [17], and thus establishes associativity
as a candidate foundational mechanism for a social cognitive
architecture. Similarly, with associativity being considered
sufficient for generating predictions as noted above, and pre-
diction/anticipation being considered essential for sociality in
terms of supporting coordination [18], then such an account
of memory remains consistent.
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An alternative implementation using similar principles of
associativity and interactive learning has been applied to a
range of embodied and developmental psychology models
related to language. The Epigenetic Robotics Architecture
(ERA) [19] emphasises associative learning, and is instantiated
through linked self-organising maps (SOM), arranged through
a “hub” SOM that learns from body posture. This structure,
learning from a blank initial state, can provide an account
of how aspects of language can extend cognitive processing
[20], and of how word learning in infants is mediated by body
posture [21]. In each of these examples, the computational in-
stantiation of ERA is the same, but the functionality observed
differs based on the interaction context of the experiment.
Given the fundamentally associative nature of the learning
process, this is consistent with the memory-centred account of
social human-robot interaction competence described above.
In many principled but low-level approaches – including the
those systems based on the developmental systems paradigm,
as subscribed to here – there is often a gap between the theo-
retical consistency and the complexity of the applied resulting
system, with simplified (or rather constrained) problems typi-
cally targeted. While the memory-centred approach advocated
here suffers similarly, the range of applications outlined in
the previous paragraphs cover a number of aspects of “higher
level” (indeed, human-level) cognition that go beyond the
typical domains for low-level associative systems. The efforts
described here remain relatively sparse and currently lack a
computational integration into a single coherent system that
existing psychologically-derived cognitive architectures (such
as SOAR, ACT-R, etc) attempt. Nevertheless, there appears to
be a convergence of principles of operation that the present
work seeks to extend: cognition founded on formation and
manipulation of memory, and memory as associative and
developmental. At the least, what is proposed here is a re-
framing of the problem: not to look at cognition from the
perspective of the ‘computation’ or the behavioural outcome
as is typical, but rather to re-evaluate the problem from the
perspective of memory.
III. THE SUFFICIENCY OF AN ACCOUNT OF MEMORY
The outcome of this discussion is a commitment to a
fundamentally associative structure of memory, with this main-
taining consistency with the developmental perspective, and
as illustrated through the social human-robot interaction and
language examples. The outline described in this abstract
points to a framework within which the relationship between
memory and cognition can be understood, although there
remain a number of open questions that need to be resolved,
such as reconciliation with empirical evidence supporting the
multi-systems organisation of memory, e.g. [10], and the in-
terplay of memory with non-memory mechanisms underlying
cognition (such as affective processes, e.g. [22]). Nevertheless,
the proposal is that even these aspects could be approached
from the perspective of memory. In all, this leads to the view
that in order to ‘solve’ cognition, the problem of memory
must be fully resolved. Indeed, the suggestion of the present
contribution goes beyond this: that a full account of memory
may be sufficient to provide an account of cognition.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Current software for AI development requires the use of
programming languages to develop intelligent agents. This
can be disadvantageous for AI designers, as their work needs
to be debugged and treated as a generic piece of software
code. Moreover, such approaches are designed for experts;
often requiring a steep initial learning curve, as they are
tailored for programmers. This can be also disadvantageous
for implementing transparency to agents, an important ethical
consideration [1], [2], as additional work is needed to expose
and represent information to end users.
We are working towards the development of a new editor,
ABOD3. It allows the graphical visualisation of Behaviour
Oriented Design based plans [3], including its two major
derivatives: Parallel-rooted, Ordered Slip-stack Hierarchical
(POSH) and Instinct [4].
The new editor is designed to allow not only the develop-
ment of reactive plans, but also to debug such plans in real time
to reduce the time required to develop an agent. This allows
the development and testing of plans from a same application.
II. BEHAVIOUR ORIENTED DESIGN
Behaviour Oriented Design (BOD) [5], [6] takes inspiration
both from the well-established programming paradigm object-
oriented design (ODD) and Behaviour-Base AI (BBAI) [7],
to provide a concrete architecture for developing complete,
complex agents (CCAs), with multiple conflicting goals and
mutual-exclusive means of achieving those goals. BBAI was
first introduced by Brooks [7], where intelligence is decom-
posed into simple, robust modules, each expressing capabil-
ities, actions such as movement, rather than mental entities
such as knowledge and thought.
Bryson’s BOD is a cognitive architecture which promotes
behaviour decomposition, code modularity and reuse, making
the development of intelligent agents easier. BOD describes
the agent’s behaviour into multiple modules forming a be-
haviour library. Each module can have a set of expressed
behaviours called acts, actions, perceptions, learning, and
memory. Behaviour modules also store their own memories,
i.e. sensory experiences.
Action selection is forced by competition for resources. If
no such competition exists, the behaviour modules are able to
work in parallel enforcing the long-term goals of the agent
A. POSH
POSH planning is the action selection for reactive planning
derivative of BOD. POSH combines faster response times
similar to reactive approaches for BBAI with goal-directed
plans. A POSH plan consists of the following plan elements:
1) Drive Collection (DC): It contains a set of Drives and
is responsible for giving attention to the highest priority
Drive. To allow the agent to shift and focus attention,
only one Drive can be active in any given cycle.
2) Drive (D): Allows for the design and pursuit of a specific
behaviour as it maintains its execution state. The trigger
is a precondition, a primitive plan element called Sense,
determining if the drive should be executed by using a
sensory input.
3) Competence (C): Contains one or more Competence
Elements (CE), each of which has a priority and a
releaser. A CE may trigger the execution of another
Competence, an Action Pattern, or a single Action.
4) Action Pattern (AP): Used to reduce the computational
complexity of search within the plan space and to allow
a coordinated fixed sequential execution of a set of
Actions.
B. Instinct
The Instinct Planner is a reactive planner based on the
POSH planner. It includes several enhancements taken from
more recent papers extending POSH [8]. In an Instinct plan,
an AP contains one or more Action Pattern Elements (APE),
each of which has a priority, and links to a specific Action,
Competence, or another AP.
III. THE PLAN EDITOR
The editor provides a customisable user interface (UI) aimed
at supporting both the development and debugging of agents.
Plan elements, their subtrees, and debugging-related informa-
tion can be hidden, to allow different levels of abstraction and
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present only relevant information. The graphical representation
of the plan can be generated automatically, and the user can
override its default layout by moving elements to suit his needs
and preferences. The simple UI and customisation allows the
editor to be employed not only as a developer’s tool, but also
to present transparency related information to the end users,
helping them to develop more accurate mental models of the
agent.
Alpha testers have already used ABOD3 in experiments to
determine the effects of transparency on the mental models
formed by humans [9], [10]. Their experiments consisted of
a non-humanoid robot, powered by the BOD-based Instinct
reactive planner. They have demonstrated that subjects, if they
also see an accompanying display of the robot’s real-time
decision making as provided by ABOD3, can show marked
improvement in the accuracy of their mental model of a
robot observed. They concluded that providing transparency
information by using ABOD3 does help users to understand
the behaviour of the robot, calibrating their expectations.
Plan elements flash as they are called by the planner and
glow based on the number of recent invocations of that
element. Plan elements without any recent invocations start
dimming down, over a user-defined interval, until they return
back to their initial state. This offers abstracted backtracking
of the calls. Sense information and progress towards a goal are
displayed. Finally, ABOD3 provides integration with videos of
the agent in action, synchronised by the time signature within
the recorded transparency feed.
Fig. 1. The ABOD3 Graphical Transparency Tool displaying an Instinct plan
in debugging mode. The highlighted elements are the ones recently called by
the planner. The intensity of the glow indicates the number of recent calls.
ABODE3 provides an API that allows the editor to connect
with planners, presenting debugging information in real time.
For example, it can connect to the Instinct planner by using a
built-in TCP/IP server, see Figure 2.
IV. CONCLUSION
We plan to continue developing this new editor, implement-
ing debug functions such as “fast-forward” in pre-recorded
log files and usage of breakpoints in real-time. A transparent
agent, with an inspectable decision-making mechanism, could
Fig. 2. System Architecture Diagram of ABOD3, showing its modular design.
All of ABOD3 was written in Java, to ensure cross-platform compatibility.
APIs allows the expansion of the software to support additional BOD planners
for real-time debugging, BOD based plans, and User Interfaces. The editor
aims, through personalisation, to support roboticists, games AI developers,
and even end users.
also be debugged in a similar manner to the way in which
traditional, non-intelligent software is commonly debugged.
The developer would be able to see which actions the agent
is selecting, why this is happening, and how it moves from
one action to the other. This is similar to the way in which
popular Integrated Development Environments (IDEs) provide
options to follow different streams of code with debug points.
Moreover, we will enhance its plan design capabilities by
introducing new views, to view and edit specific types of plan-
elements and through a public beta testing to gather feedback
by both experienced and inexperienced AI developers.
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Abstract—This short paper outlines a framework for an 
evaluation method that takes as an input a model of an 
anthropomorphic artificial hand and produces as output the set 
of tasks that it can perform. The framework is based on the 
anatomy and functionalities of the human hand and methods of 
implementing these functionalities in artificial systems and 
focuses on the evaluation of the intrinsic hardware of robot 
hands. The paper also presents a partial implementation of the 
framework: a method to evaluate anthropomorphic postures 
using Fuzzy logic and a method to evaluate anthropomorphic 
grasping abilities. The methods are applied on models of the 
human hand and the InMoov robot hand; results show the 
methods' ability to detect successful postures and grasps. 
Keywords— Haptic Feedback, Haptic Rein, Navigation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The human hand is considered the most dexterous and 
sophisticated manipulator currently existing. Robotics 
developers naturally look towards the human hand for 
inspiration when designing robotic end-effectors. This 
inspiration varies from imitating its shape to attempting to 
replicate its functionality. 
Hand construction (anatomy) gives rise to capabilities. Hand 
capabilities can be motion or sensory. Hand construction 
components can be categorised into structure, [contact] 
surfaces, sensors, and actuation components. 
Consequently, functionalities can be categorized according to 
task aim into information exchange (sensing), static grasping, 
within-hand manipulation, force exchange, or visual 
expression [1].  
We propose a framework for an evaluation method of 
functionalities of anthropomorphic artificial hands based on 
the anatomy and functionalities of a human hand. 
II. THEORETIC CONSIDERATION
Anthropomorphic artificial hands "should" approximate the 
human hand physically and functionally; therefore, 
understanding anthropomorphism requires understanding the 
construction and operation of both human and artificial hands. 
By analysing the construction and tasks of human and 
artificial hands, a relation can be established between physical 
components of the hand and the tasks it can perform. 
A simulation method must be used to evaluate the 
performance of the hand at each type of tasks (categorised 
according to the task aim). 
The overall performance of the hand can be correlated to 
individual components by analysis or by repeating the 
evaluation while changing the component, therefore 
establishing a value representing the contribution of individual 
components to the overall performance allowing optimisation 
of hand construction. 
The method should be able to describe generic tasks as well as 
specific ones (i.e. allow for arbitrary task modelling) 
Fig. 1. Human and robotic hands “constructions” 
III.  PROTOTYPE DESIGN
Task description syntax is developed that describes the task in 
terms of  
1) Anthropomorphic postures used to perform the task
2) Objects involved in the task and the Interaction with
the objects (pose, information or force exchange,
contact locations, prehension)
3) Motion required to perform the task
Postures are described using a syntax based on descriptions of 
British Sign Language (BSL) signs. A posture description 
takes the form of  “hand/hand part(s) is/are at [state]” (for 
example: “The hand is [tightly closed] and the thumb is 
[across the fingers]”) [2] 
IV. EVALUATION
Evaluation of a posture is performed using Fuzzy logic, 
evaluation of prehension is performed using grasp quality 
metrics. 
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The evaluation process scans the configuration space of the 
hand and compares the posture to the reference postures (from 
the task model) using a mapping based on the human hand 
skeleton. 
The two methods are implemented in MATLAB and tested on 
models of the human hand, Shadow robot hand, and InMoov 
robot hand using the postures of the seventeen basic 
handshapes of BSL [2] and thirty-one of the grasps of Feix 
grasp taxonomy [3]. 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The methods were tested by evaluating the performance of a 
human hand model. The results showed, as expected, that the 
model can perform all the reference tasks (which are known to 
be possible to perform using the human hand). Robot hands 
scored less, for example, the InMoov hand was only able to 
perform fourteen grasps, five of which had very poor 
anthropomorphism. 
The hand configuration space is very large, scanning the entire 
space is time consuming, especially when it must be sampled 
at a fine resolution to allow valid contact on hands with rigid 
surfaces. This is even a bigger problem when the object itself 
has a large configuration space (range of possible poses w.r.t. 
the hand). 
Using grasp quality metrics and not using a separate step to 
verify closure conditions leads to situations where the ability 
of the hand to grasp objects cannot be correctly determined. 
VI. FUTURE WORK
Future research will focus on developing methods to evaluate 
the remaining functionalities (dexterous manipulation, active 
sensing, and non-prehensile manipulation).  In order to 
achieve this we plan to perform the correlation analysis 
between hand components and hand functional performance to 
obtain values associated with the contribution of each 
component.  Then we proceed with constructing a database 
containing hardware components, each pre-analysed and 
assigned functional performance, compatibility, and cost 
(monetary, computational, and energy) values for every 
defined hand function and other components. Based on the 
data in the database, new hands can be designed using a 
selection process that aims to maximise performance and 
compatibility sums while minimising cost sum. 
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Abstract—The rescue services face numerous challenges while 
entering and exploring dangerous environments in low or no 
visibility conditions and often without meaningful auditory and 
visual feedback. In such situations, firefighters may have to rely 
solely on their own immediate haptic feedback in order to make 
their way in and out of a burning building by running their hands 
along the wall as a mean of navigation. Consequently the 
development of technology and machinery (robots) to support 
exploration and aid navigation would provide a significant benefit 
to search and rescue operations; enhancing the capabilities of the 
fire and rescue personal and increasing their ability to exit safely. 
In our research, the design of a new intelligent haptic rein is 
proposed. The design is inspired by how guide dogs lead visually 
impaired people around obstacles. Due to complexity, the system 
design is separated into distinct prototype systems: sensors and 
monitoring, motion/feedback and the combined system with 
adaptive shared control. 
Keywords— Haptic Feedback, Haptic Rein, Navigation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the experiments conducted, a problem appeared when the 
robot made sharp movements; the human user had significant 
difficulty following the trajectory of the robot. In such cases, the 
system could be improved through pre-emptive indications to 
the user and a mutual adaption of both the robot and user's 
response (speed and turning rate) should be taken into 
consideration in order to maintain consistent fluid locomotion.  
Following on from the previous research it has been proposed 
that an intelligent stiff rein system with the feedback of the 
environment and perceptual capabilities can enable and enhance 
navigation in complex environments. Additionally the use of 
haptic communication through force feedback guiding the user 
can be considered as a suitable approach to providing navigation 
information and is the least affected mode of communication in 
noisy environments [1]. 
II. WORK DEFINITION
The work focusses on investigating and building a prototype 
mobile robotic rein, which aims to emulate the natural and 
adaptable control relationship observed between a guide dog 
and a human user during navigation in new environments as 
Figure 1 shows. The research continues the work established 
in the REINS project [2]. 
Fig. 1. Comparison between environments of a visually impaired and a 
firefighter 
The proposed robotic rein will be designed and constructed to 
facilitate variable levels of haptic control and feedbacks 
allowing the user to either provide direct control over the 
proposed path of direction or the rein provide selective 
resistance/force. This will be achieved by using a high 
resolution stepper motor (position & torque control) in order to 
enforce the user response to the necessary change of route or 
direction determined by the mobile robot. In order to develop a 
prototype intelligent rein, detailed information about the relative 
positioning and compliance/resistance of the user to the robots 
responses must be known. This information is then be processed 
by the shared control system to provide adaptive control and 
force feedback. Figure 2 shows the stiff rein prototype with 
sensors and actuators (stepper motors) mounted on. 
III.  PROTOTYPE DESIGN
The sensor design measures the vertical and horizontal rein 
angle by using digital encoders. The data collected by the 
sensors is analyzed, processed and subsequently interpreted into 
movement of the rein to actively guide the human in the desired 
trajectory. Proportional levels of the torque are applied to 
describe the intensity and the amount of movement (haptic 
feedback) that the user must respond to. Monitoring the rein 
torque (user compliance and resistance) and their relative 
position to the robot will then provide feedback into the control 
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of the robot movement, adjusting the speed and rate of direction 
change accordingly.  Both the sensor system and motor control 
is being implemented on a small embedded platform (National 
Instruments my RIO). 
Fig. 2. Stiff rein prototype 
IV. CURRENT WORK
The initial sensor system prototype has been completed and it 
provides detailed feedback on the human/rein interaction. 
Sensors have been mounted at all the flexing/moving joints 
and interfaced to a PC based logging system that will allow 
the capture of the rein kinematics during experiments. The 
work on the 2nd phase prototype, which aims to provide 
haptic force feedback, is nearly finished. Actuators are 
mounted and matched with the rein to give a specific 
movement as a haptic force feedback to user forearm with 
controlling the speed and angle. Figure 3 shows the structure 
of the prototype II. Test procedures are being developed to test 
the suitability of actuates to human sensing. 
Fig. 3. Structure of prototype II 
V. CONCLUSION 
A first stage prototype system has been developed, which 
focuses on the deployment of suitable sensors to allow 
accurate and reliable measurement of the robot, rein and users 
relative positions. The data are required to enable for further 
stages of the intelligent robotic rein design. The stiff rein 
solves the issues of robot localization and orientation with 
respect to the user and provides a direct method of haptic 
feedback. The first prototype was tested and completed as the 
first part of the research.  The majority of second prototype 
(motion /feedback system) has been finished and we are 
developing test procedures to insure the force haptic feedback 
is suitable for a human forearm. The overall system aims to 
mimic the complex shared control relationship observed 
between a guide dog and a human user.   
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Abstract—The prefrontal cortex (PFC) in the brain is 
considered as the main responsible of cognitive processes. This 
brain area is adjacent to the sensorial and motor cortices, and 
most importantly, gets innervated by dopamine, the 
neurotransmitter associated to pleasure and reward. This setting 
allows neuronal ensembles belonging to the PFC to form 
associations between sensory cues, actions and reward, which is 
exactly what is needed for a control mechanism to emerge. In 
order to allow cognitive control, an agent must be able to both 
perceive and form associations between the perceived inputs and 
the available actions. These associations will form the experience 
of an individual, thus shaping his behaviour. A fundamental 
process supporting cognition is offered by the working memory 
(WM), that is a small, short-term memory containing and 
protecting from interference goal-relevant pieces of information. 
The WM exploits the dopamine activity for two functions: as a 
gating signal, which determines when useful information can 
enter, and as a learning function, which allows the memory to 
learn whether the currently stored information is good or not 
with respect to a certain situation and the undergoing task. 
Grounding our work on biological and neuroscientific studies, we 
extend our Intentional Distributed Robotic Architecture 
(IDRA) 1 with a more powerful model of the memory, in 
particular exploiting the capabilities of the WM. IDRA is a 
bioinspired modular intentional architecture shaped and acting 
as the amygdala-thalamo-cortical circuit in the human brain; the 
architecture deals mainly with two tasks, which are the storage of 
representations of the current situation in a way similar to what 
the visual cortex does, and the autonomous generation of goals, 
starting from a set of hard-coded instincts. Yet, IDRA relies on 
an external Reinforcement Learning (RL) agent to perform 
actions, but most important it lacks of a task-driven memory 
system. We defined a new IDRA core module, which is called 
Deliberative Module (DM), with the addition of a model of the 
WM. The DM can act as both WM storage and actions 
generator, thanks to the introduction of a powerful chunk 
selection mechanism. A chunk is an object containing arbitrary 
information that competes for retention in an active memory 
storage. Transforming the problem of selecting actions to that of 
retaining chunks, we are able to exploit the same exact 
mechanism for both retention of chunks and generation of 
actions, consequently dropping out the RL agent previously in 
1
A. M. Franchi, F. Mutti, G. Gini, “From learning to new goal generation in 
a bioinspired robotic setup”, Advanced Robotics, 2016,  DOI 
10.1080/01691864.2016.1172732
charge of generating the actions. During each agent-environment 
interaction, the WM receives from sensors and inner processes 
the current state and a set of chunks of information proposed for 
retention. Its task is to select the best possible combination of 
them to maximize the future reward, estimated through a linear 
function approximator. The number of chunks that can be 
maintained in WM is small, 7 at maximum. Our WM model is 
composed by two modules, the first devoted to perception ad the 
second to choice. It receives in input the set of possible chunks, 
and outputs the content of the active memory, i.e., those chunks 
that are to be retained in memory. The perception stage builds a 
description of the currently perceived situation to obtain a sparse 
vector representing the state of the system it terms of percepts. 
The action selection selects the percepts to be kept as the WM 
content. This process is a form of context-sensitive learning as 
percepts are selected depending on both the current state and the 
context. The perception process is a cascade of feature extraction 
and clustering aimed at classifying the current input in an 
unsupervised fashion, obtaining their corresponding percepts.  It 
first applies Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to reduce the 
dimensionality of the problem, then Independent Components 
Analysis (ICA) to extract the independent components, and 
finally K-Means to cluster data in the IC space. In this way the 
raw input is transformed into a set of perceivable classes 
represented in sparse coding. The active memory stage has to 
discard the percepts less useful keeping into consideration the 
limited capacity of its memory. After training, the experience is 
codified as “rules” determining the module's retention policy. We 
tested the WM model with available datasets to check whether 
the perception phase is able or not to create optimal features and 
clusters with respect to the input data, which can be produced by 
very heterogeneous sources. We compared our pipeline of sensor 
processing composed by PCA, ICA, and Softmax with the 
baseline being only Softmax on a heterogeneous dataset for 
classification, containing about 1500 entries coming from 
different sources (UCI repository), with nine classes. The result 
tells us that our pipeline outperforms the baseline, which is not 
able to distinguish at all some of the classes. In particular the 
addition of ICA is fundamental for dealing with heterogeneous 
data. Other experiments more relevant for robotics have been 
executed as well, demonstrating a good performance. 
Nevertheless, improvements are under way to integrate imitation 
learning in order to speed up the learning process.  
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Abstract— High bandwidth contacts and unforeseen 
deviations from planned actions are common in early human 
development. We here present the GummiArm, an open-source 
robot with characteristics that make it interesting for studying 
development, human motor control, and real-world applications 
that require robustness and safety. Joints with antagonist 
actuators and rubbery tendons provide passive compliance, 
where the stiffness can be adjusted in real-time through co-
contraction. The robot structure is made printable on low-cost 
3D printers, enabling researchers to quickly fix and improve 
broken parts. The arm has 7+3 Degrees of Freedom (DOF), of 
which 8 have variable stiffness. It is currently being replicated 
across 3 research groups, and we hope to establish a thriving and 
productive community around this replicable platform. 
The DeCoRo project is funded by a Marie Curie Intra-European 
Fellowship within the 7th European Community Framework Programme 
(DeCoRo FP7-PEOPLE-2013-IEF). 
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ABSTRACT 
Cognitive Architectures have been an active area of research for more than two decades, starting from well-known 
examples such as ACT-R. Beyond modeling human performance, one of the promising domains of application of 
cognitive architectures is in real-world embodied situated systems, such as robots. However, most of the existing systems 
have failed to be used widely, arguably for a number of reasons, the main being that they seem to have provide little added 
value to real-world complex interactive robot designers as compared to a totally ad-hoc approach. To address this 
situation, here we will present desiderata and an example of practical real-world cognitive architecture for the humanoid 
Gagarin, aiming to fill the gap between strongly defined systems and totally ad-hoc. 
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